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Vindicating the Rights of People Living with AIDS
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act
By MargaretB. Kwoka*

INTRODUCTION

Despite centuries of development of the "rule of law" and courts'
attempts to stand on the shoulders of precedent, legal doctrine does not
usually appear to follow a singular, logical, or linear path-in fact it
frequently defies common sense entirely. 1
However, the reemployment of common sense in the law is vital in some instances; it
does not, for example, make sense that people have a fundamental right
to travel between states, 2 but no right of access to life-saving medication
which costs less than fifty cents a day. 3 Indeed, life-saving medications

are being withheld from millions of people suffering from human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS), who will die as a result.4 Advocates for people living
* Equal Justice Works Fellow, Public Citizen Litigation Group. J.D., Northeastern University
School of Law 2007; A.B., Brown University 2002. Special thanks to Professor Brook K. Baker,
for his invaluable guidance and wealth of knowledge, to say nothing of his dedication to fighting
the AIDS injustice, and to Professor Hope Lewis, whose example inspires my interest in
international human rights law. I am also deeply indebted to Cdsar Cuauhtrmoc Garcfa
Hernindez for, among many other things, his unfailing encouragement and tireless comments on
earlier drafts. Finally, I dedicate this to my mom, Anita Marie Benvignati.
1. See, e.g., William Burnham, "Beam Me Up, There's No Intelligent Life Here": A Dialogue
on the Eleventh Amendment with Lawyers from Mars, 75 NEB. L. REV. 551 (1996) (humorously
addressing the complexity and absurdity of Eleventh Amendment doctrine through an imaginary
conversation with Martians); see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881)
(asserting that law is based on human experience).
2. The right to travel is derived from the privileges and immunities clauses found in Article IV
of the U.S. Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, and has three separate components
including 1) the right of a citizen of one state to enter and leave another state; 2) the right of a
citizen of one state to be a welcome visitor in another state; and 3) the right of a citizen of one
state to relocate to another state as a resident and be treated as other residents of the new state.
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).
3. Importing generic anti-retroviral therapy medicines can cost as little as $149 per year, per
patient. TONY BARNETr & ALAN WHITESIDE, AIDS INTHE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: DISEASE
AND GLOBALIZATION 367 (2d ed. 2006).
4. Though HIV and AIDS are distinct medical afflictions, for the purposes of this Article they
are considered as one. Since the early 1980s, when AIDS awareness truly began, over twenty-
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with HIV/AIDS (PWAs) 5 are therefore compelled to argue logic into
the law.
Of course, some governments-especially those with few funds,
many obligations, and large populations of PWAs-cannot afford even
the fifty cents a day for each citizen in need.6 Logic would dictate, and
international law espouses, a standard that recognizes the reality of the
situation for such governments and demands only their best efforts to
provide life-saving medications to their populations. 7 This standard
may be somewhat amorphous, 8 but certainly is not unreasonable. Even
if countries are falling far short of this best-efforts standard, it seems
evident that such a goal is both sensible and necessary. 9 It is on this
five million people have died from the disease. YANN ARTHUS-BERTRAND, THE NEW EARTH
FROM ABOVE: 365 DAYS, at May 18 (Anthony Roberts trans., 2007). Treatment programs are
extremely effective in prolonging the life of people living with AIDS. In Brazil, where universal
treatment was implemented in the mid-1990s, statistics show that the median length of survival
for patients diagnosed with AIDS in the 1980s was five months, for patients diagnosed in 1995
eighteen months, and for cases diagnosed in 1996 fifty-eight months. ANNE-CHRISTINE
D'ADESKY, MOVING MOUNTAINS, THE RACE TO TREAT GLOBAL AIDS 36 (2004). The program
was characterized by "quickly restored health and a return to productivity" in the Brazilian
population. Id.; see STEPHANIE NOLEN, 28 STORIES OF AIDS IN AFRICA 14 (2007) ("I have seen
people at the edge of death get suddenly, gloriously well again, just like they do at home.").
5. Throughout this Article, the term PWA will be used to describe the class of individuals who
could bring a lawsuit under the theory of this Article. This group would include those individuals
who have been unable to access medicines in countries affected by the drug companies' lawsuits
discussed in this Article. Lack of access constitutes their cognizable injury. It could also include
families of individuals who have died from AIDS. For simplicity, PWA will encompass all of
these potential plaintiffs.
6. The reasons for developing countries' inability to affoid basic necessities for their
citizens-even though such necessities are not only humanitarian but also necessary to maintain a
sufficiently healthy workforce to sustain the economy-are complex. Throughout the 1990s,
when the AIDS pandemic became an urgent agenda item, one factor weighing heavily on
developing countries and strapping them further for cash was the percentage of developing
countries' foreign exchange earned from exports spent repaying international debt acquired
through foreign aid. For instance, in 1990, many developing countries spent between one-quarter
and one-third of their entire foreign exchange earnings servicing their debt burden. JAMES M.
CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 483 (2d ed. 2004). By
1999, economic crises in Latin America raised that percentage to 75% in the case of Argentina
and a horrifying 110.9% in the case of Brazil. Id.; see also D'ADESKY, supra note 4, at 292
(arguing that debt relief could have a "major impact" on governments' ability to pay for increased
treatment efforts).
7. See infra Part I.A (exploring the rights to health and life as defined by international law).
8. See infra Part IV.A (discussing courts' reluctance to enforce rights that are not specific and
definite, and PWA plaintiffs' potential cure for such a problem).
9. UNAIDS, a joint United Nations program formed in response to HIV/AIDS sponsored by
numerous other United Nations agencies and based in Geneva, Switzerland, has commented on
the necessity of such a goal. See About UNAIDS, http://www.unaids.org/en/AboutUNADS/
default.asp (last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
The commitment to universal access is not a target itself. Instead, it emphasizes the
need for far greater urgency, equity, affordability, and sustainability in national
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premise that the citizens of a country arguably have a right to their
governments' best efforts, if not a right to any singular or specific

action.
Even though many governments have made substantial efforts to
provide access to these medications, 10 they are a long way from
universal access to medicines; these efforts simply represent
governments trying to meet the needs of their people, a standard which
guarantees nothing tangible for PWAs. A government in this position is
likely one of the 153 parties to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
to Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the leading international
intellectual property agreement. I A TRIPS member country is left with
two basic choices. It could simply buy medicines from the patentholding U.S.-based corporations, which sell them at between two-and-ahalf12 and 10013 times the price of a generic. Alternatively, the
government could pursue one of a few options available under TRIPS
for accessing lower-cost medications. The latter is a particularly likely
course of action for a government with few resources, which is a
common situation in countries with large populations of PWAs. 14 The
responses to AIDS .... Governments therefore made a commitment to rapidly set
national targets that reflect the urgent need to scale up toward the goal of universal
access by 2010.
The Secretary-General, Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS and PoliticalDeclaration
on HIV/AIDS: Focus on Progress over the Past 12 Months, 1 2, U.N. DOC A/61/816 (Mar.
20, 2007) [hereinafter Declarationof Commitment 2007 Progress Report]; see infra Part I
(providing background on the extent of the AIDS pandemic and the necessity of treatment).
10. See infra Part H.A, B (exploring examples of countries' attempts to provide low-cost
medications).
11. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, art. 14(l)-(3),
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 301 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS].
All WTO member countries are de facto parties to the TRIPS Agreement.
Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, Intellectual Property: protection and enforcement,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tife/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
Currently, there are 153 member countries. Understanding the VTO: The Organization,
Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/org6_e.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2009).
12. Colleen V. Chien, HIV/AIDS Drugsfor Sub-SaharanAfrica: How Do Brand and Generic
Supply Compare?, 2 PLOS ONE e278 (2007), http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender
.fcgi?artid =1805689. The differential prices of second line therapies are much higher than first
line therapies, in part as a result of stronger patent protections. Id.
13. Treatment for one patient at U.S. prices costs $15,000.
Rick Hink, AIDSTRIPS:
Intellectual Property and AIDS Medication in South Africa, http://www.american.edu/ted/
aidstrips.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
14. The bulk of people living with HIV and AIDS are in poor countries. For instance, "SubSaharan Africa remains the region most heavily affected by HJV, accounting for 67% of all
people living with HIV and 75% of AIDS deaths in 2007." UNAIDS, 2008 REPORT ON THE
GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 32 (2008), available at http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/
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two options most often employed under TRIPS are (1) issuing what are
known as "compulsory licenses" and (2) engaging in "parallel
importation."' 15 The details of compulsory licensing and parallel
importation are in some ways less important than the fact that these
16
mechanisms are recognized as lawful options under TRIPS.
Governments attempting to meet the needs of their populations would
17
be well-advised to use either of these methods.
In theory, this situation, where international law both espouses a
standard of best efforts and provides mechanisms with which
governments can make such efforts, represents a move toward increased
access to medicines. Although a country may have a staggering number
of people with an illness otherwise equated to a death sentence, 18 the
government's legal obligation to try to help its population by providing
life-saving medications allows it to exercise its lawful rights under
international intellectual property rules to access those medications at a
low cost. However, this model fails to account for pharmaceutical
companies' repeated and systematic reactions, which include lawsuits.
Pharmaceutical companies have made the tactical decision to sue
governments exercising their rights under TRIPS, despite the wellsettled interpretations of TRIPS under which governments may take
precisely those actions. 19 These governments, already strapped for
cash, must defend their well-intentioned efforts to save lives by
spending precious money addressing legal claims drafted by well20
funded, industry-hired lawyers.
Understandably, this conduct has been widely condemned on moral
grounds. 2 1 Furthermore, the bare assertion that everyone, including
HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Global-report.asp.
15. See infra Part I.A (discussing these mechanisms in detail).
16. See generally BROOK K. BAKER, DFID HEALTH SYSTEMS RESOURCE CENTRE,
PROCESSES AND ISSUES FOR IMPROVING ACCESS To MEDICINES: WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY

To UTILISE TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES IN NON-PRODUCING COUNTRIES (2004), available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/dfidbrookbakertrips.pdf (discussing various ways in which
countries currently not producing medicines can exercise TRIPS flexibilities to meet
pharmaceutical needs).
17. Id.
18. The United States Bureau of the Census projects that, for instance, in Botswana, the life
expectancy in 2010 without AIDS would be 74.4 years, and the life expectancy with AIDS would
be 26.7. BARNETT & WHITESIDE, supra note 3, at 299.
19. See infra Part II.B (discussing examples of such lawsuits).
20. See Mark Heywood, People Come Before Profit; The Drug Companies' LitigationAgainst
South Africa Is Immoral, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/mar/05/aids.comment (estimating that the lawsuits are
costing millions of pounds).
21. For instance, when thirty-nine pharmaceutical companies sued the South African
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these companies, has the right to have their disputes adjudicated in court

is simply insufficient justification. Indeed, people in many instances do
not have a right to sue. For example, plaintiffs in the United States
cannot bring frivolous lawsuits,22 they cannot sue without standing,23
they cannot sue if they are in the wrong jurisdiction, 24 they cannot sue if
the harm suffered is not recognized by the court,2 5 they cannot sue if the
people they want to sue have immunity, 26 and they cannot sue if the
27
government has not created the right by statute or common law.
This Article proposes merely one more prohibition on suing: no
one-individuals or corporations- should be able to sue if the mere act
of the lawsuit would result in a human rights violation. More
specifically, this Article argues that companies can and should be liable
when their costly and meritless lawsuits prevent a government from
meeting the needs of its citizens, thereby violating those citizens'
human rights. In that vein, this Article explores one method of using
existing law-the Alien Tort Claims Act 2 8 (ATCA)-to render
pharmaceutical companies' lawsuits actionable conduct for which they
can be held accountable. It may be one method of vindicating the rights

government for passing its 1997 amendments to the Medicines Act, which permitted the
governments to exercise lawful options to reduce the price of AIDS medicines, the European
Union, the World Health Organization, the National AIDS Council in France, and 250,000
signers of a Doctors Without Borders petition publicly supported the South African government.
Rachel L. Swarns, Companies Begin Talks with South Africa on Drug Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
2001, at A3.
22. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (allowing sanctions against a lawyer who files a lawsuit for an
improper purpose, which is frivolous, or whose allegations or denials lack evidentiary support).
23. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (denying parents of black schoolchildren the
right to sue the IRS for granting tax-exempt status to private schools that discriminate on the basis
of race in violation of the law).
24. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (dismissing a
suit for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a company whose parts were
incorporated into products sold in the state in which the suit was brought).
25. See Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., 605 N.E.2d 805 (Mass. 1993) (holding that emotional
injury alone is not sufficient to sustain a tort action, it must be accompanied by physical injury
resulting from the emotional distress).
26. For instance, absolute immunity is afforded to judges, legislators, and prosecutors when
they are acting in their job function. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998) (legislative
immunity); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (prosecutorial immunity); Forrester v. White, 484
U.S. 219 (1988) (judicial immunity). All other government officials are afforded qualified
immunity when a constitutional right is not clearly established such that a reasonable official
would not know he was violating someone's rights. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
27. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing a court to dismiss a claim for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted).
28. The Alien Tort Claims Act is also known as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (2006); see Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104,
113 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008).
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of people dying en masse from a disease that modern medicine has the
full ability to treat.
Part I provides background, including information about the AIDS
pandemic 2 9 and its relationship to the pharmaceutical companies. Part
II examines instances, particularly one in South Africa, where
pharmaceutical companies have sued to stop the governments' lawful
conduct under TRIPS, and the outcomes of those cases. Part III
discusses the ATCA and how a PWA, unable to obtain medications in
one of the countries subject to a pharmaceutical company lawsuit, might
make out a claim under the ATCA.
I. AIDS LITIGATION BACKGROUND
It is no secret that the world is in the midst of a crisis of horrifying
proportions. 30 Globally, thirty-nine million people are living with HIV
or AIDS. 3 ' Of these, almost twenty-five million are living in subSaharan Africa. 32 In 2006 alone, over four million people were newly
infected, and almost three million died from the disease. 3 3 Although
treatment has increased tenfold in the last three years, even the most
optimistic estimates show that only twenty-three percent of the more
than four million people in Sub-Saharan Africa whose lives could be
saved by Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (ARV) are receiving
it.34 Moreover, deaths are increasing annually, a phenomenon that is
"largely the result of an increase in the number of people with advanced
HIV infection and in urgent need of treatment, whose numbers are
rising faster than the scale-up of antiretroviral therapy." 3 5 This failure

29. The word pandemic is used to describe the spread of a disease "throughout an entire
country, continent, or the whole world." WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1042 (1996). In contrast, an epidemic is "affecting at the same

time a large number of persons in a locality, and spreading from person to person." Id. at 479.
30. For instance, every five years, ten countries in Sub-Saharan Africa lose ten percent of their
active adult population to HIV/AIDS. ARTHUS-BERTRAND, supra note 4, at May 18. Recently,

the U.N. wasted no words in addressing the scale of the crisis: "[We n]ote with alarm that we are
facing an unprecedented human catastrophe." Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS, G.A. Res.
60/262, 1 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/262 (June 15, 2006).
31.

UNAIDS, 2006 AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE 1 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 AIDS EPIDEMIC

UPDATE), availableat http://data.unaids.org/pub/EpiReport 2006/2006-EpiUpdateen.pdf.
32. Id. at 10.
33. Id.at 1.
34. Id.; see LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, THE AIDS PANDEMIC: COMPLACENCY, INJUSTICE, AND
UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS 304 (2004) (estimating that ninety-five percent of people needing

treatment are not receiving it).
35.

Declaration of Commitment 2007 ProgressReport, supra note 9, at 2.
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to adequately scale up treatment is in a context where, for instance, one
in five adults in Zimbabwe is living with HIV.3 6
Historically, international consensus on how to address the AIDS
37
crisis in developing countries has focused heavily on prevention.

Indeed, hailed as a "major milestone" in the global response to AIDS,
the "Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS" issued in 2001 by the
United Nations (UN) states that "[p]revention must be the mainstay of
our response." 38 Despite the prevalent view that "a choice between
prevention and treatment [was] unavoidable for poor countries" because
of insufficient resources, 39 AIDS activists have raised awareness about
the dreadful consequences of such an approach for the vast number of
people already living with HIV/AIDS, as well as their families,
40
communities, and economies.
36. 2006 AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 31, at 11.
37. See, e.g., Prevention 'Focus of HIV Fight,' BBC NEWS, Dec. 1, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/health/4484662.stm (reporting that the EU ministers "backed efforts to
give people around the world better access to condoms and effective information on how to
reduce their risk of infection," and that the UK pledged support for research on vaccines and
microbicides).
38. Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, G.A. Res. S-26/2 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/l
(Aug. 2, 2001).
39. ALEXANDER IRWIN, JOYCE MILLEN & DOROTHY FALLOWS, GLOBAL AIDS: MYTHS AND
FACTS; TOOLS FOR FIGHTING THE AIDS PANDEMIC 60 (2003). Not only do prevention-only
advocates stress the cost of providing universal access to treatment, they also cite the difficulties
of delivering medications appropriately in areas with little health care infrastructure, which, they
claim, results in an inability to ensure proper adherence to a complex drug regime. Id. at 73.
These seemingly neutral logistical arguments can reveal their true xenophobic and racist origins,
with comments like those of one high-ranking U.S. official that Africans "have a different
concept of time" and therefore couldn't adhere to a treatment plan, or the implication that some
people are simply "too poor to treat" by dubbing treatment to not be "cost-effective" in poor
countries. Id. at xix-xx. See NOLEN, supra note 4, at 102-103 (quoting then head of the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) as saying, in 2001, that people in Africa
"do not know what watches and clocks are... they use the sun."). This notion even made its way
into the popular television series, The West Wing, in an episode portraying negotiations between
drug companies and a fictional African leader, where one character explained that the problem
with providing free universal treatment was that Africans cannot tell time in order to follow a
complex treatment plan.
THE WEST WING, IN THIS WHITE HOUSE (Warner Brothers
Entertainment 2004). Moreover, such characterizations have been disproven. From the poorest
parts of Haiti to remote villages in Uganda, community-based AIDS treatment programs have
demonstrated compelling results. See IRWIN, MILLEN &FALLOWS, supra at 83-86 (describing a
commitment-based AIDS treatment program in Haiti); Paul J. Weidle et. al., Adherence to
Antiretroviral Therapy in a Home-Based AIDS Care Programme in Rural Uganda, 388 THE
LANCET 1587 (2006); see also NOLEN, supra note 4, at 103 (explaining how Doctors Without
Borders programs in African countries had adherence rates as high or even higher than those in
North America).
40. IRWIN, MILLEN & FALLOWS, supra note 39, at 63 ("Many of these infected people will die
of AIDS in the midst of their most productive years of work and parenting, generating enormous
losses not only for individuals and families, but for society as a whole."); see also NOLEN, supra
note 4, at 68 ("In Zambia today, basic demographics are horribly skewed. One in three children
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As a result, among international organizations concerned with the
AIDS pandemic, treatment is gaining global attention. InJune 2006,
the UN declared that the international community had a goal of
"4universal access" to treatment by 2010.41 It has reaffirmed its
commitment to that goal in subsequent statements. 42 UNAIDS 43 issued
its first comprehensive progress report on this goal in April 2007.4 4

Although this report indicated a significant increase in treatment rates in
sub-Saharan Africa, those rates fell far short of universal access to

medication, at best indicating that a quarter of the population in need of
treatment was receiving it.4 5

The President's Emergency Plan For

AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) also began to take treatment goals seriously and
to provide some funds for treatment programs in fifteen "focus"
countries. 46 Likewise, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria (Global Fund), founded in 2002,4 7 aimed to fund treatment for
is an orphan. One in five people has HIV/AIDS. In a country of eleven million, at least 600,000
people have already died, almost all of them young adults."). Some have labeled this two-tiered
system, wherein people living with HIV/AIDS in developed countries have access to effective
treatment, and those in poor countries are denied such access and thus left to die, to be a form of
"global medical apartheid." NOLEN, supra note 4, at 61. The ethical implications of such a
situation are beyond the scope of this Article, but remain central to its motivation.
41. Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS, supra note 30, $ 20. The Declaration states:
[We c]omnmit ourselves to pursuing all necessary efforts to scale up nationally driven,
sustainable and comprehensive responses to achieve broad multisectoral coverage for
prevention, treatment, care and support, with full and active participation of people
living with H1V, vulnerable groups, most affected communities, civil society and the
private sector, towards the goal of universal access to comprehensive prevention
programmes, treatment, care and support by 2010.
Id.
42. Specifically, the U.N. issued a progress report on the goals outlined in the Declaration of
Commitment in 2007, and further called for the organization of a comprehensive review of
progress achieved to be undertaken in 2008. See Declaration of Commitment 2007 Progress
Report, supra note 9; G.A. Res. 62/178, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/178 (Jan. 25, 2008).
43. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing UNAIDS).
44. UNAIDS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNICEF, TOWARDS UNIVERSAL ACCESS:
SCALING UP PRIORITY H1V/AIDS INTERVENTIONS INTHE HEALTH SECTOR (2007), available at
http://www.who.intlhiv/mediacentre/univeral-accessprogress-reporten.pdf.
45. In three years, this report claims, the rate of treatment among those people living with
AIDS for whom treatment was necessary rose from approximately two percent to twenty-eight
percent. Id. at 5.
46. About PEPFAR, http://www.pepfar.gov/about/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2008). PEPFAR was
announced in President George W. Bush's 2003 State of the Union address, where he pledged $15
billion over five years. On May 27, 2003, President Bush gave authorization for PEPFAR. On
July 30, 2008, President Bush signed into law H.R. 5501, the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde
United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization
Act of 2008, which answered his call to extend the PEPFAR program for five additional years.
Id.
47. The Global Fund is a partnership organization created by international organizations, UN
agencies, and national governments. It operates as a channel for funding and does not administer
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1.8 million people over five years.4 8 All of these organizations that
provide medicines, however, are limited by the market prices of the
49
drugs that they purchase.
The differential in prices between patented medications and generics

is considerable and can mean the difference between access to treatment
and a lack of or much more limited access.5 0 In fact, the 2006 UNAIDS
report itself indicates that the price of medicines had dropped
substantially and "contributed significantly to the wider availability of
treatment. '5 1 Paul Farmer, a leading expert on the treatment of disease

in resource-poor countries, is notorious for providing aggressive
treatment for a variety of diseases with great success to some of the

poorest communities in Haiti.52 As early as 1998, he provided free
its own projects. The Global Fund, How the Fund Works, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/
about/how/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2008); The Global Fund, The Road to the Fund,
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/road/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
48. The Global Fund, Fighting AIDS, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/hivaids/ (last visited
Jan. 9, 2009).
49. For instance, PEPFAR requires that medicines purchased by the program's money be
approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration; currently seventy-three percent of
the medicines it purchases are sourced from name-brand innovator companies for frequently
double, or even triple the price. PEPFAR, Critical Intervention in the Focus Countries:
Treatment, http://www.pepfar.gov/pepfar/press/81208.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2009).
50. For instance, in 2002, when no generic alternatives were available in Thailand, the cost of
the standard triple therapy HIV/AIDS treatment regimen was $924, and only 3,000 people were
able to access treatment. After it implemented a program to acquire generic medications, at the
cost of one-eighteenth the price of the name-brand drugs, over 85,000 people were receiving
treatment by 2006. Medicins sans Frontieres, MSF Welcomes Move to Overcome Patent on
AIDS
Drug
in
Thailand,
http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?component
=article&objectid=37D61 AAB-5056-AA77-6CC24F9946C41565&method=fullhtml
(last
visited Aug. 10, 2008). Moreover, the common refrain that patent-protection is necessary to
promote innovation and compensate pharmaceutical companies for their research and
development outlays has been severely undermined. Notably, advertising, marketing and
administrative expenditures vastly exceed research and development costs, sometimes by a factor
of three. IRWIN, MILLEN, & FALLOWS, supra note 39, at 118. One study showed that U.S.
pharmaceutical companies use only 1.3 cents of every dollar of revenue for the development of
new drugs. Donald W. Light & Joel Lexchin, Foreign Free Riders and the High Price of US
Medicines, 331 BRITISH MED. J. 958, 959 (2005). Moreover, public funds, administered through
the National Institutes of Health, aid in the development of some of the drugs that generate the
largest profits, including many AIDS medications. IRWIN, MILLEN, & FALLOWS, supra note 39,
at 118. Finally, even if unaffordable prices for life-saving medicines were necessary to
compensate for research and development, this would merely indicate that the funding
mechanism for research and development needed to be rethought wholesale; indeed, this is the
case regardless.
51. TOWARDS UNIVERSAL ACCESS, supra note 44, at 6. The report indicates that the price of
first-line ARVs decreased between thirty-seven percent and fifty-three percent in low- and
middle-income countries between 2003 and 2006. Id. The report also notes, however, that
second-line ARVs, for which no generic alternatives are widely available, remain "unaffordably
high." Id.
52. See generally TRACY KIDDER, MOUNTAINS BEYOND MOUNTAINS: THE QUESTION OF DR.
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ARV therapy for patients in advanced stages of AIDS. 53 However,
Farmer has frequently encountered the bitter reality that in order to fully
treat his patients he has to pay market prices for the necessary drugs, no
matter how expensive. 54 Although Farmer tried buying medicines in
countries whose markets provided the lowest prices, patented drugs

were often simply out of reach. 55 Farmer's U.S.-based nongovernmental organization, Partners in Health, eventually turned some
of its attention away from direct patient services, focusing instead on
political solutions to the high cost of necessary medications. Despite
making some headway, it was clear at each step that the pharmaceutical
56
companies presented a unified front against any reduction in prices.
Although access to AIDS medication has not been the subject of
extensive litigation controversy thus far, litigation in the United States
surrounding the topic of HIV and AIDS is not new. In fact, AIDSrelated litigation represents the largest number of cases attributable to a
single disease in American history. 57 Courts have addressed claims
concerning AIDS education, blood supply, public health surveillance,
state regulation of public places such as bathhouses and bookstores, tort
PAUL FARMER, A MAN WHO WOULD CURE THE WORLD (2003). Kidder chronicles the path of
Paul Farmer from modest upbringings to service in Haiti at various clinics while a medical
student, to his creation of Zanmi Lasante, a full-service no-cost clinic in the rural region of
Cange, Haiti, where he single-handedly changed the lives of entire communities of desperately
poor Haitians through comprehensive health care. See id.
53. IRWIN, MILLEN, & FALLOWS, supra note 39, at 83. Farmer has dubbed his philosophy to
"prioritize patients' urgent need for lifesaving treatment over deliberations about the
appropriateness of introducing 'first world' therapies in a 'third world' setting" as the
"preferential option for the poor," a concept rooted in Latin American liberation theology. Id. at
xxi, 83-84.
54. KIDDER, supra note 52, at 175-76. Although Farmer also treats people living with H1V
and AIDS, Kidder focuses on Farmer's programs to treat multi-drug resistant tuberculosis, which
requires an expensive regimen of second-line medications still strictly held under patent. Id.
Farmer's experience trying to obtain medications at any practicable cost is instructive as to the
necessity of affordable solutions for treatment of a wide range of diseases in the developing
world. See id.
55. Id. at 170, 175 (explaining how Partners in Health went from saving substantial money for
a crisis to becoming completely bankrupt after funding just a small pilot program to treat drugresistant tuberculosis in Peru).
56. According to a Partners in Health worker, at an international meeting called to explore
price reductions of essential medicines for people in developing countries, drug companies argued
that prices ought to remain high because there was a very small potential paying demand for the
drugs. Id. at 170-71. Furthermore, the WHO backed out of the meeting entirely, despite its
initial promise of support. Id. at 170. In addition to the drug companies' resistance to lower
prices, the public health experts seemed to believe that treatment was simply "too expensive" for
certain diseases, without considering the possibility of lowering the primary cost-the patented
drugs themselves. Id. at 166. This fact prompted Kidder to observe that "[expensive] treatment
was cost-effective in a place like New York, but not in a place like Peru." Id. at 166.
57. GOSTIN, supra note 34, at 27-28.
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litigation for false diagnoses and fear of exposure, administration of
58
justice discrimination, and family law.
First Amendment and Equal Protection doctrines have been
particularly crucial in gaining rights both for PWAs and AIDS
activists. 59 Courts have held that the First Amendment protects the
right to distribute various prevention messages. 60 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has extended protection against discrimination to classes
of people living with infectious diseases. 6 1 The Americans with
Disabilities Act deems discrimination in places of public
accommodation against people living with HIV or AIDS to be
unlawful 62 and health care providers are prohibited from discriminating
against people living with HIV or AIDS. 6 3 A definable collection of
rights has therefore emerged. 64
With a history of litigation over the rights of PWAs in U.S. courts
and the emerging consensus on the need for treatment in light of the
magnitude of the international crisis, the stage is set for PWA plaintiffs
to assert the right of access to treatment. Specifically, PWAs abroad can
use the courts to stop the pharmaceutical company lawsuits which
hinder governments' attempts to provide them with treatment.

58. Id. at 28-29.
59. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (Free Speech Clause); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (Equal
Protection Clause).
60. Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1997) (concerning
prevention messages distributed on a college campus); AIDS Action Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transit
Auth., 42 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994) (concerning prevention messages on public transit); see GOSTIN,
supra note 34, at 30.
61. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (classifying a person with
tuberculosis as protected from discrimination and entitled to reasonable accommodation).
62. GOSTIN, supra note 34, at 50 (noting that cases have been brought against hotels,
securities brokerage firms, public transportation authorities, athletic facilities, day care providers,
prisons, and public services). Although insurers are also subject to the ADA, they are still
permitted to conduct the ordinary "underwriting" or risk assessment process, which may
nonetheless end up denying coverage to people living with HIV. Id. at 52.
63. Id. at 51. But see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1) (2006) (excluding applicants for admission to the
United States on the basis of their HIV status because equal protection does not apply in the
immigration context).
64. It is important to note that in American jurisprudence, frequently the rights of PWAs are
adverse to arguable interests in public health, such as mandatory testing, screening, or treatment
and disclosure of HIV status. See GOSTIN, supra note 34, at 65. However, because the rights of
PWAs are not in tension with any public health goal in the case of access to treatment, this
conflict is outside the scope of this Article.
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II. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES' STRATEGY: LAWSUITS AS
RETALIATION

The international intellectual property regime, favorable as it is to
drug companies generally, does provide explicit and important
flexibility for developing countries with health crises. However, recent
history suggests that pharmaceutical companies will challenge even
completely legitimate actions by countries whose governments seek to
reduce the price of medicines or increase access to generics.
A. InternationalIntellectual Property Regime: Optionsfor Developing
Countries?
65
In 1994, the member states of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) signed the TRIPS agreement into law. 6 6 TRIPS was designed to
be a comprehensive international instrument concerning intellectual
property; it addresses copyright, trademarks, patents, trade secrets, test
data, and other industry-related topics. 6 7 TRIPS also created an
enforcement mechanism, providing for dispute resolution through the
W'To. 68
The protections for patent holders under TRIPS are very strong.
TRIPS grants patent holders exclusive rights to produce and price their
products under a provision stating that "patents shall be available for
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and
are capable of industrial application." 6 9 This standard therefore

65. The WTO, with 153 member countries, was established in 1995 and is located in Geneva,
Switzerland; it administers international trade agreements and handles trade disputes between
nations. World Trade Organization, What Is the WTO?, http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/
whatis.e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
66. TRIPS, supra note 11. The TRIPS Agreement is Annex IC of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization. Id.
67. World Trade Organization, Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/tripse/intel2_e.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2008). Prior to TRIPS, other
conventions, namely the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, governed the international
intellectual property landscape. Id. TRIPS incorporated by reference most of the standards in
those existing agreements, but also strengthened some existing intellectual property protections
and added new ones in areas where there had been none. Id.
68. Id. The inclusion of a dispute mechanism within TRIPS itself necessarily implies that
TRIPS was meant to be enforced in that venue, not by means of lawsuits in national legal systems
of individual countries. The fact that pharmaceutical companies would choose the latter option,
discussed infra Part II.B, may belie the companies' fear--or even certainty-that the WTO
would, if given the opportunity, find the countries exercising TRIPS options to be acting within
the law.
69. TRIPS, supra note 11, at art. 27 1.
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mandates that each member country grant patents of both "products,"
giving the patent holders of medicines exclusive rights over the

composition of the drug itself regardless of how it is produced, and of

"processes," giving the patent holder of medicines exclusive rights over
the scientific method of producing the drug. 70 Moreover, TRIPS does
not permit countries to adopt national laws exempting certain classes of
products from patent protection, such as medicines. 71
Although
72
standards,
patent-protection
"minimum"
as
frequently characterized

these provisions significantly change many countries'
practices of refusing
patents for processes
reverse engineering
protections explicitly

historical

patent grants to medicines entirely, or granting
rather than end-product drugs, thus allowing for
of medicines. 7 3 Moreover, these "minimum"
provide a floor but no ceiling as to the amount of

protection that a pharmaceutical company in the U.S. may receive
through bilateral or multilateral treaties; indeed, agreements heightening
the protections beyond the already high TRIPS standards are so
common that
they are collectively referred to as "TRIPS-plus"
74
agreements.

70. Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67.
71. Brook K. Baker, Producing HIV/AIDS Medicines for Export/Import Under TRIPS,
Articles 31(F), (K), and 30, at 3 (Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue Briefing Paper, Nov. 6,
2001).
72. See Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67 (stating that "the Agreement sets out
the minimum standards of protection to be provided by each Member").
73. Indeed, approximately fifty countries did not patent pharmaceutical products prior to
TRIPS. Baker, supra note 71, at 2. For instance, India and Brazil previously did not classify
medicines as a patentable product at all, preferring to grant "process" patents. Id. at 3. However,
TRIPS did exempt pre-ratification products; thus, those medicines or products discovered before
1995 were subject to the country's pre-1995 rules. Id. As a result, India and Brazil can and have
continued to manufacture reverse-engineered pre-1995 medicines in accordance with TRIPS. Id.
74. The TRIPS agreement explicitly provides that more "extensive" protections can be
negotiated bilaterally or multilaterally. See TRIPS, supra note 11, at 321. For an updated list of
TRIPS-plus agreements, most initiated by the United States or the European Union, see Genetic
Res. Action Int'l [GRAIN], "TRIPS-plus" Through the Back Door (update 2008), available at
http://www.grain.org/rights/tripsplus.cfm?id=68.
TRIPS-plus agreements have heightened
standards as to specific countries on a variety of issues, including parallel importation and
compulsory licenses, discussed infra pp. 115-20. See World Bank Group, Tightening TRIPS:
The Intellectual Property Provisionsof Recent US Free Trade Agreements, TRADE NOTE 20, Feb.
7, 2005, at 5-6. Moreover, some TRIPS-plus agreements have heightened the protection for test
data on drugs' safety and efficacy, which, under TRIPS, is protected only from "unfair
commercial use" rather than providing for complete data exclusivity. Id. at 2. Unilateral action
can, on occasion, benefit developing countries, such as instances where the United States and
others have unilaterally declared that they will not enforce certain TRIPS provisions when
breached to address particular public health crises. Margo A. Bagley, Legal Movements in
Intellectual Property: TRIPS, Unilateral Action, Bilateral Agreements, and HIV/AIDS, 17
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 781, 787 (2003). The true benefit of that kind of action is questionable,
however, where there is no guarantee that such an enforcement moratorium will continue or be
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The strong protections for U.S. corporate interests found in TRIPS
come as no surprise. 75 One analysis asserts that:
[D]eveloping countries signed TRIPS because of a failure of
democratic processes, both nationally and internationally, that enabled
a small group of men within the U.S. to capture the U.S. trade-agendasetting process and then, in partnership with European and Japanese
multinationals, draft intellectual property principles that became the
blueprint for TRIPS. 76
Adopting the position that trade should be linked to intellectual
property even prior to TRIPS, the U.S. first harnessed an old program
designed to give greater access to U.S. markets for developing
countries' basic agricultural exports-the General System of
Preferences (GSP)-and infused it with a system of rewards and
punishments based on those countries' compliance with U.S.-style
intellectual property laws. 7 7 Under the refashioned GSP, the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) was given the power to initiate a "section 301"
action against a country, at the request of an "interested party," to
determine if the country lacked "adequate and effective" protection for
U.S. intellectual property. 7 8 If the USTR determined that the country
honored, and where such moratoriums are not negotiated in a recognized international forum.
Moreover, seemingly unrelated trade provisions can affect access to medicines; for instance,
heightening intellectual property regimes as to other products, such as engineered plants (which
affect food prices), can hinder a country's ability to provide medicines as a result of increased cost
of other necessities. See generally id.
75. See GOSTIN, supra note 34, at 305 ("The international trade system is specifically
designed to safeguard the proprietary interests of corporations."); Baker, supra note 71, at 3
(noting that the pharmaceutical industry "played a lead role in the negotiation of TRIPS, not only
by convincing trade representatives to champion its interests, but by direct lobbying during the
negotiation."); Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, PharmaceuticalPatents, and Access to Essential Medicines:
A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 28 (2002) ("The implementation of
TRIPS is expected to have a further upward effect on drugs prices, while increased R&D
investment, despite higher levels of intellectual property protection, is not expected."). The
pharmaceutical industry was particularly involved. For instance, Pfizer was "instrumental" in
developing the idea that intellectual property rules should be linked to the international trade
regime. The Comer House, Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? Political Organising Behind
TRIPS 8 (2004), available at http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/pdf/ briefing/32trips.pdf.
76. The Comer House, supra note 75, at 2. Getting the U.S. government on board in the first
place was a triumph of corporate ingenuity. First, corporations had to convince the political
leaders that intellectual property and the lack of systematic protections internationally was
hindering the U.S. economy as a whole, and that other countries were widely transgressing the
rights of U.S. patent-holders. Id. at 10-11. The U.S. governments' wholesale purchase of this
party line was a necessary precursor to the international campaign in which it engaged. Id.
77. Id. at 11-12. GSP originated in 1976. Id. at 12. The refashioning of GSP occurred when
the program was due to end as a result of the 1984 Trade and Tariff Act. Id. at 13. At that time,
some countries protested that a program originally designed to provide assistance to less
developed countries had been perverted into a method of control. Id.
78. 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (2004). This provision is an amendment to Section 182 of the Trade Act
of 1974 by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, codified at 19 U.S.C. The
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lacked adequate and effective protections, the country was placed on a
trade "watch list" and faced possible trade sanctions. 79 The goal of the
section 301 system was to bilaterally negotiate tougher intellectual
property protections across the planet. 80 These bilateral agreements
then weakened developing countries' incentives to fight TRIPS during
negotiations because the countries had already given up so much
81
through bilateral agreements.
Despite the industry-influenced patent standards embodied in TRIPS,
there are still very important flexibilities within the document. The two
most important flexibilities written into TRIPS itself are known as
parallel importation and compulsory licensing. 8 2 Parallel importationsometimes referred to as parallel trade-arises when pharmaceutical
companies sell the same brand-name drug at differing prices in different
countries. 8 3 Purportedly, these different prices arise because of varying
economic, social, or legal landscapes in different markets. 84
A
purchaser in a country where the drug's prices are high will acquire
pharmaceuticals from dealers in the countries with lower prices, thereby
85
reducing the end cost in the high-priced country.

Corner House, supra note 75, at 13 & n.62.
79. The Corner House, supra note 75, at 13. Notably, there was considerable support for the
notion that Section 301 was itself illegal under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), the precursor to the W/TO. Id. at 16; see The V/TO, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewtoe/thewto e.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
80. The Corner House, supra note 75, at 15. This strategy worked, as countries attempted to
"appease" the USTR so as not to create a true dispute. Id.
81. Id. at 16. For example, the U.S. used section 301 against Brazil for failing to enact patent
protections for medicines, and Brazil eventually was forced to cave to U.S. pressure so as not to
lose access to U.S. markets, trade with which constituted 25% of the country's total trade. Id.
After Brazil enacted new patent laws, the U.S. concluded that Brazil would not block the effort to
multilateral patent standards because it would have nothing left to lose. Id. Indeed, this broke up
the unified resistance of several South American countries to patents on medicines. Id.
82. There is also a general statement providing that countries may be exempted from TRIPS
obligations, but this provision does not grant specific rights, and therefore is less useful to
countries trying to provide AIDS medications at low cost to their citizens. See TRIPS, supra note
11, at 332. The text of this provision reads: "Members may provide limited exceptions to the
exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict
with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties." Id.
83. Julia A. Moore, ParallelTrade, UnparallelLaws: An Examination of the Pharmaceutical
Parallel Trade Laws of the United States, the European Union and the World Trade
Organization,6 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 77, 80 (2006).
84. See id.. In reality, the pharmaceutical companies charge "whatever a local market win
bear." BAKER, supra note 16, § 3.2, at 22.
85. Moore, supra note 83, at 80.
This is, essentially, "comparison-shopping on an
international scale." BAKER, supra note 16, § 3.2, at 21.
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Parallel importation is permissible when a country has adopted,
through national legislation, a "rule of exhaustion" of intellectual
property rights. A rule of exhaustion dictates that after the first sale of a
product into a market, the patent-holder's rights have been "exhausted,"
and the holder has no further ability to prevent, control, or profit from
future sales or trading. 86

TRIPS declines to regulate parallel

importation in its provisions because the exclusive rights granted to the
patent holder for "making, using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing" a patented product are always "subject to the provisions of
Article 6. ''87 Article 6 declares TRIPS' neutrality towards the issue of

exhaustion by stating that "nothing in this Agreement shall be used to
88
address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights."
The issue of exhaustion, therefore, was left to member states to

determine under national law, which then dictates whether a country can
89
engage in parallel importation.

Pharmaceutical companies are deeply opposed to parallel importation
because price discrimination on a global scale is a highly profitable
marketing strategy. 90 There may be a legitimate concern that enforcing
86. Jeffery Atik & Hans Henrik Lidgard, Embracing Price Discrimination: TRIPS and the
Suppression of Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals,27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1043, 1046

(2006). The majority of developing countries without the ability to produce AIDS medications
on their own have not adopted a rule of exhaustion. BAKER, supra note 16, § 3.2, at 22.
However, some have. For instance, Kenya has a very strong rule of exhaustion, which includes
generic drugs that are produced pursuant to compulsory licenses. Id. This approach may or may
not fit within the permissible exhaustion rule under TRIPS, but certainly could be valid if the
TRIPS provision were read broadly. Id.
87. TRIPS, supra note 11, at 331, 332 & n.6.
88. Id. at 323; Atik & Lidgard, supra note 86, at 1046. At least one commentator suggests
that the 2005 Amendments to TRIPS, codifying the Doha Declaration, alter TRIPS' neutrality on
parallel importation, favoring a prohibition of the practice. See Atik & Lidgard, supra note 86, at
1076. This is not the position of the World Health Organization, which asserts that Doha did not
alter the neutrality of TRIPS toward exhaustion. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial
Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter
Doha Declaration]. In any event, the potential test cases, particularly the events that occurred in
South Africa, discussed below, all occurred before the Doha Declaration and are thus not affected
by any changes that Doha made. Indeed, Doha is widely viewed as simply reaffirming and
strengthening the already announced flexibilities in TRIPS. See Hoen, supra note 75, at 28
(stating that the Doha Declaration "gave primacy to public health over private intellectual
property, and clarified WTO Members' rights to use TRIPS safeguards.").
89. See TRIPS, supra note 11, at 323. The rule of exhaustion is dispositive of a country's
ability to engage in parallel importation of name-brand medications sold by the patent-holder or a
licensee. BAKER, supra note 16, § 3.2, at 22. However, it is unclear whether such rule would
permit parallel importation of medications produced under compulsory licenses, as those licenses
may be a non-permissive use of the patent. Id.; see Moore, supra note 83 and accompanying text
(for a brief discussion of parallel importation).
90. BAKER, supra note 16, § 3.2, at 22. Pharmaceutical companies also claim that parallel
importation, amid other "anti-patent" behavior, causes reduced profits, falling stock values, and
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price discrimination is necessary to enable companies to market drugs
to developing countries at reduced cost without risk that those drugs
will be re-imported into developed countries. 9 1 However, that risk, if

actualized, would suggest a need for a ban on parallel importation into
developed countries only, not impoverished nations. 92 Furthermore,

parallel importation can greatly benefit developing countries by
93
assuring the quality of a product through access to name-brand drugs.
In any case, the policy interests and resulting debate on the merits of

parallel importation do not change the fact that TRIPS

has

unambiguously left the question of exhaustion up to each member
country to decide as a matter of national law.

Unlike parallel importation, which is a strategy for lowering the cost
of brand-name medication, compulsory licensing is a method of
obtaining generic drugs at low cost by nationally authorizing production
94
and sale of a generic version of an otherwise-patented medication.
Compulsory licensing is permitted by TRIPS, which provides that a
member may, through national law, allow others to use the subject
matter of a patent without the patient-holder's authorization in limited
95
circumstances and subject to a number of conditions.
Compulsory licenses can be issued for any reason, provided that the

government first attempts to negotiate a permissive license from the
patent holder. 9 6 Even the negotiation requirement is waived, however,
less available money for research and development. See Moore, supra note 83, at 81. Moreover,
Moore asserts that parallel importation is not dictated by the rule of exhaustion, because
exhaustion was only ever meant to apply within a certain market, i.e., domestically, and that
international exhaustion reaches beyond the rationale of the rule. Id. This position fails to
recognize that only a small amount of drug company revenues are spent on research and
development, that drug companies, left unchecked, do not price medicines humanely, and that a
public health crisis is an acceptable reason to utilize exemptions from a harsh intellectual property
regime. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Hoen, supra note 75, at 29 (stating
that Mddecins sans Frontires (MSF) asserts that increased patent protections leads to higher drug
prices, which leaves drugs out of reach for people in poor countries).
91. Atik & Lidgard, supra note 86, at 1058.
92. BAKER, supra note 16, § 3.2, at 23. The European Union has adopted a rule such as this,
which allows for price discrimination and parallel importation, but not re-importation of
medicines back into EU countries. Id.
93. Id. § 3.2, at 23, chart 8.
94. See id. § 3.3, at 24.
95. TRIPS, supra note 11, at 333. The provision states in pertinent part: "Where the law of a
Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the
right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by the government, the
following provisions shall be respected... Id.
96. Id. at 333. The provision states:
[Sluch use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms
and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable
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when a country faces a national emergency, or if the country is only
issuing a license for governmental non-commercial use, also known as a
government use order. 9 7 As Jeffery Atik and Hans Henrik Lidgard
argued, "[t]here can be little doubt that least-developed and developing
countries most affected by epidemic diseases are in an emergency
situation under TRIPS Article 31 and that they are fully entitled to use
the system of compulsory licensing. '"98 A country issuing a compulsory
license must also provide for compensation of the patent-holder based
on the economic value of the license. 99 Moreover, TRIPS permits
compulsory licenses without many of the otherwise applicable
restrictions in the event that the patent holder has acted anticompetitively, although such provision has not played a major role in
10 0
increasing access to AIDS medications to date.
It is important to note that although these flexibilities were built into
TRIPS from the outset, they are seldom used. Part of the reason for the
lack of compulsory licensing is that most developing countries in need
of pharmaceuticals do not have the technology or industrial
infrastructure necessary to produce medicines under compulsory
licenses.10 1 Moreover, countries were hesitant to use compulsory
licenses and parallel importation for fear that they would suffer
retaliation from the international community, as eventually occurred in
102
a variety of ways.

period of time. This requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public noncommercial use. In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably
practicable. In the case of public non-commercial use, where the government or
contractor, without making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to
know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right holder
shall be informed promptly.
Id.
97. Id.; BAKER, supra note 16, § 3.3, at 24.
98. Atik & Lidgard, supra note 86, at 1050.
99. TRIPS, supra note 11, at 333.
100. Id. at 334 ("Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth [previously] where
such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to
be anti-competitive.").
101. Atik & Lidgard, supra note 86, at 1050-51. As of 2004, only Mozambique, Zimbabwe
and Malaysia have issued compulsory licenses or government use orders. BAKER, supra note 16,
§ 3.3, at 26, chart 9.
102. Moore, supra note 83, at 105 ("Although the TRIPS Agreement contained provisions
allowing countries to override patent rights in some situations, to allow compulsory licensing of
patents, and to adopt necessary measures to protect public health, the provisions were ambiguous
and countries were hesitant to employ them for fear of trade reprisals."). See infra Part 11.B
(discussing various instances of retaliation).
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As a result of the scarce use of these TRIPS flexibilities, 0 3 in 2001
the WTO reexamined TRIPS and issued what is known as the "Doha
Declaration," a statement focused on public health crises in the
developing world and access to medicines. 104 In particular, Paragraph
Six of the Doha Declaration recognizes the need for increased flexibility
for countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capabilities in
pharmaceuticals. 10 5 This was a problem particularly because TRIPS
itself limits the use of compulsory licenses to production
"predominantly" to supply the domestic market. 10 6 However, the Doha
Declaration and a subsequent amendment to TRIPS created an
exception to this limitation, allowing for export of products produced
under compulsory licenses beyond fifty percent of production in limited
circumstances. 10 7 This provision has been implemented in a 2003 WTO
decision granting such a waiver with respect to the exportation of
medications produced under compulsory licenses to countries without
production capacity when the importing country has demonstrated
need. 10 8 The decision was later codified in a 2005 amendment to the
TRIPS Agreement. 10 9
103. Atik & Lidgard, supra note 86, at 1051.
104. Doha Declaration, supra note 88.
105. This section reads:
We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in
the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory
licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an
expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council before the end
of 2002.
Doha Declaration, supra note 88, 6.
106. TRIPS, supra note 11, at 333.
107. BAKER, supra note 16, § 3.5 at 30. Other exceptions to the predominately-for-domesticuse requirement exist as well, such as in the case of anti-competitive behavior on the part of the
patent holder. TRIPS, supra note 11, at 334. Others possibly exist under the Article 30 provision
allowing limited exceptions to patents where the exception does not unreasonably interfere with
the rights of the patent holders. BAKER, supra note 16, §§ 3.3, 3.4; see supra note 82 and
accompanying text.
108. General Council Decision, Implementation of Paragraph6 of the Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 2, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003) ("The obligations of an
exporting Member under Article 31 (f) of the TRIPS Agreement shall be waived with respect to
the grant by it of a compulsory licence to the extent necessary for the purposes of production of a
pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an eligible importing Member(s) in accordance with
the terms set out below ....
"). The Chairman of the General Council issued a statement
accompanying this decision which can provide some clarification to the Paragraph 6 Decision,
but has uncertain legal effect. See Press Release, Carlos Perez del Castillo, General Council,
World Trade Organization, General Council's Statement (Aug. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/English/news e/news03_e/trips stat_28augO3_e.htm.; BAKER, supra note
16, § 2, at 11.
109. Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, Dec. 6, 2005, WT/LJ641, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-je/wtl64 1_e.htm.
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Finally, TRIPS also offers developing countries further flexibility
through transition periods which allow countries more time to comply,
and by not applying TRIPS retroactively, thereby exempting some older
drugs from TRIPS requirements. 110 Taken together, TRIPS itself, the
Doha Declaration, and the Paragraph Six implementation constitute the
major legal framework governing access to medicines in the global
market.11 1
B. The Public Verdict Is In: Drug Company Lawsuits Are
Unconscionable
112
1. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association v. South Africa

South Africa has one of the most progressive constitutions in
history, 1 13 guaranteeing the right to health care, including reproductive
care, and stating that the government must "take reasonable legislative
and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realization of each of these rights." 114 Soon after the South
African Constitution was ratified, the legislature amended the 1965
Medicines and Related Substances Control Act (Medicines Act) to be
11 5
consistent with the rights enumerated in the constitution.
The Medicines Act tried to fulfill the progressive health care
guarantees of the South African Constitution by exercising the limited
flexibility permitted under the international trade regime.116 For
110. BAKER, supra note 16, § 2, at 12, chart 2.
111. Id. §2,at 11.
112. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n of S. Afr. v. The Republic of S. Afr., 1998 High Court of South
Africa, Case No. 4138/98 (S.Afr.).
113. Jennifer Joni, Access to Treatment for HIV/AIDS: A Human Rights Issue in the
Developing World, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 273, 274 (2002). "Progressive" in this context is
characterized by heightened protections for socio-economic rights, or, in the international human
rights context, what are labeled economic, social, and cultural rights. See id; see also
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force
January 3, 1976 [hereinafter ICESCR].
114. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 27, available at http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/
index.htm.
115. Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, No. 90 (1997), available at
http://www.info.gov.zaldocuments/acts/l1997.htm [hereinafter Medicines Act]; Joni, supra note
113, at 276.
116. South Africa's courts have determined that there are, in fact, positive duties owed by the
government that arise from its constitution, including the duty of the government to provide heath
care services and to take all reasonable steps to meet that obligation in spite of resource
constraints. Joni, supra note 113, at 275-76. This positive right concept is in contrast to most
other constitutional provisions which guarantee only negative rights, including the vast majority
of those in the U.S. Constitution (e.g., the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, protected by the Fourth Amendment, or the right not to have one's speech proscribed by
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instance, section 22(f) provided for the automatic substitution of generic

medicines by pharmacists when brand-name prescriptions were
filled. 17 Additionally, section 22(g) regulates the pricing mechanism
for medicines and establishes a pricing committee. 118 And, most
notably, the amendments included the addition of section 15(c),
addressing "[m]easures to ensure supply of more affordable
medicines." 1 19 This section provided for lawful parallel importation in
circumstances "to protect the health of the public," by allowing the
Minister to determine that the patent-holder's rights had been exhausted
120
when the product entered the original market.
The response to the Medicines Act-both from the U.S. government
12 1
and from the pharmaceutical industry-was immediate and hostile.
The Clinton Administration repeatedly expressed its displeasure with
the effects of the Medicines Act on patent-holders' intellectual property
rights. 122 Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., sent a. letter to Deputy
President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki expressing concerns about the
parallel importation provisions. 123 Soon thereafter, the USTR, spurred
by a complaint from the Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers
of America (PhRMA), a lobbying group that promotes the interests of
pharmaceutical companies, publicly threatened South Africa with trade

the government, protected by the First Amendment). See U.S. CONST. amend. I, IV.
117. Medicines Act, supra note 115, § 22(f).
118. Id. § 22(g).
119. Id. § 15(c).
120. Id. This Section provides:
The minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable medicines in
certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public, and in particular may(a) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Patents Act, 1978 (Act
No. 57 of 1978), determine that the rights with regard to any medicine under a patent
granted in the Republic shall not extend to acts in respect of such medicine which has
been put onto the market by the owner of the medicine, or with his or her consent; (b)
prescribe the conditions on which any medicine which is identical in composition,
meets the same quality standard and is intended to have the same proprietary name as
that of another medicine already registered in the Republic, but which is imported by a
person other than the person who is the holder of the registration certificate of the
medicine already registered and which originates from any site of manufacture of the
original manufacturer as approved by the council in the prescribed manner, may be
imported; (c) prescribe the registration procedure for, as well as the use of, the
medicine referred to in paragraph (b).
Id.
121. See generally James Love, Consumer Project on Technology, Appendix B: Timeline of
Disputes over Compulsory Licensing and Parallel Importation in South Africa (Aug.
5, 1999), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/sa-timeline.txt [hereinafter Timeline].
122. Id.
123. Id.
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sanctions under section 301 of the Patent Act. 124 South Africa was, in
fact, later placed on the U.S. government's 301 "watch list" after
tremendous political and corporate pressure. 12 5 However, public
shaming by AIDS activists-criticizing Gore's position in particular
and U.S. trade policy in general-prevented South Africa from actually
incurring trade sanctions as a result of the Medicines Act. 126 Eventually
the U.S. government retreated slightly from its initial ultra-aggressive
approach.

1 27

Nonetheless, in 1998, thirty-nine multinational drug companies
brought suit against South Africa to challenge the law. 128 The lawsuit
alleged a host of constitutional claims in an effort to invalidate the Act,

ranging from a violation of drug companies' property rights, to a
discrimination claim, to the violation of pharmacists' right to practice
their profession. 129 However, the pharmaceutical companies also
argued that the Medicines Act violated the TRIPS agreement. 130 In
particular, section 15(c), the companies contended, allowed for parallel

124. Id. (PhRMA stated that "[tihis issue is a centerpiece of our annual 'Special 301' review
of countries' intellectual property practices. Our concerns about the Medicines Act were the
central focus of a bilateral IPR teleconference we conducted March 11. We will raise the issue
again during the President's visit to South Africa. USTR and other agencies with both trade and
health policy responsibilities will continue to press the South African Government in all possible
fora as long as possible.").
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Debora Halbert, Moralized Discourses: South Africa's Intellectual Property Fight for
Access to AIDS Drugs, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 257, 274 (2002). One particular public
awareness campaign was known as "zapping," and was characterized by surprise protest actions.
Mark Milano, Persona Perspective: Zapping For Drugs, ACRIA UPDATE, Fall 2006, at 12. These
actions particularly targeted Vice President Gore for his role in pressuring South Africa to repeal
the relevant portions of the Medicines Act, and included actions at Gore's own announcement of
his presidential candidacy and several subsequent events in the days that followed. Id.
128. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n of S. Afr. v. The Republic of S. Afr., 1998 High Court of South
Africa, Case No. 4138/98 (S. Aft.); see Swarns, supra note 21; Consumer Project on Technology,
Pharmaceutical Company Lawsuit Against the Government of South Africa, http://www.cptech
.org/ip/health/sa/ pharmasuit.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
129. Joni, supra note 113, at 276. The variety of claims made by the pharmaceutical
companies that the provisions violated South Africa's own Constitution were themselves an
attempt "to use the constitution to annex additional powers and safe-guards for intellectual
property that are not part of TRIPS; to fill in some of the ambiguities in TRIPS, particularly its
vagueness around 'parallel importation'; and to warn other developing countries off a similar
path." Mark Heywood, Debunking 'Conglomo-talk'; A Case Study of the Amicus Curiae as an
Instrument for Advocacy, Investigation and Mobilisation 6 (Center for Applied Legal Studies,
Dec. 3, 2001), available at www.tac.org.za/Documents/MedicineActCourtCase/Debunking
_Conglomo.rtf. These other claims also, therefore, can be safely categorized as mere retaliation
and nuisance law suits.
130. Swarns, supra note 21.
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importation in conflict with TRIPS; 13 1 this, in spite of the clear
consensus that parallel importation was legal under TRIPS.' 3 2 In fact,

in 1998 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the lawfulness
of a parallel importation provision under the U.S. Copyright Act,
ignoring plaintiffs' pleas to look to policy concerns surrounding the
adoption of an international rule of exhaustion factoring against parallel
33
importation, as exhibited in various bilateral agreements. 1
Despite the clarity of the TRIPS provisions and the United States'
decision not to impose trade sanctions, the companies pursued the
lawsuit vigorously in 2001, insisting that the law would "destroy patent
protections."' 134 The drug companies "march[ed] to the beat of a steady
13 5
chant-that patent protection for drugs is essential for innovation."
However, it is clear that pharmaceutical companies waged this suit to
36
keep the prices of, and therefore profits from, medications very high. 1
During the suit, Treatment Action Campaign, an organization in South
Africa dedicated to achieving universal access to treatment, was
permitted to file an amicus curiae brief which addressed the scope and
impact of the pandemic as well as the legal basis for upholding the
Medicines Act. 137 Six weeks later, the pharmaceutical companies
13 8
dropped the lawsuit.

131. Joni, supra note 113, at 276.
132. See Swains, supra note 21 ("Legal experts say the key components of the law do not
threaten patent protections spelled out in World Trade Organization agreements.")
133. Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 153 (1998).
134. Henri E. Cauvin, Access to AIDS Drugs at Issue in South African Trial This Week, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2001, at A7.
135. Andrew Pollack, Defensive Drug Industry: Fueling Clash Over Patents, N.Y. TIMES,

Apr. 20, 2001, at A6.
136. GOSTIN, supra note 34, at 305.

137. Brief for Treatment Action Campaign as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Pharm.
Mfrs. Ass'n of S. Afr. v. The Republic of S. Afr., No. 4183/98 (Feb. 16, 2001), available at
http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/MedicineActCourCase/MedicineActCourtCase.htm.
Treatment Acton Campaign (TAC) was founded in 1998 specifically to target pharmaceutical
companies on access to medicines issues. NOLEN, supra note 4, at 171. Zachie Achmat, one cofounder, publicly declared that he would not take ARVs until treatment was available to all South
Africans through the public heath system. Id. TAC also waged successful suits on other access
issues, including a case in the highest court, which decided that the government was
constitutionally required to provide drugs to prevent mother to child transmission of HIV during
birth. Id. at 177. Interestingly, TAC originally found itself at odds with Nelson Mandela, who in
fact did very little about HIV during his tenure as president, but who later became an ardent
advocate of treatment, and in fact went public with the news that his own son died of AIDS. Id.
at 173, 313, 315-16.
138. Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Makers Drop South Africa Suit Over AIDS Medicine, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2001, at Al.
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Under a "barrage of public pressure,"' 39 the companies admitted that
the Medicines Act was lawful and could be enforced as written, and
agreed to pay legal fees to the government of South Africa for the
The chief executive officer of
defense against the suit. 140
GlaxoSmithKlein admitted that the public pressure impacted their
to
decision: "We're a very major corporation. We're not14 insensitive
1
decision-making."'
our
in
factor
a
is
That
opinion.
public
Despite this apparent concession by the pharmaceutical companies, it
is important to note that during the period of time between the filing of
the lawsuit and the companies' decision to drop the case,
implementation of the Medicines Act was put on hold. 142 As a result,
"measure[s] which would have drastically brought down the price of
many medicines (as well as their profitability) were delayed, saving the
pharmaceutical companies many millions of dollars and delaying the
advent of affordable health care in South Africa." 143 Thus, it is
questionable how complete a victory any country defending against
such a suit may have, even if legal victory is eventually achieved.
An industry analyst, commenting on the lasting deterrent effect of the
suit, stated that "[t]his has been a public relations disaster for the
companies. . . . The probability of any drug company suing a
developing country on a life-saving medication is now extremely low
based on what they learned in South Africa." 144 That prediction turned
out to be overly optimistic. Drug companies have been equally
aggressive in other situations, perhaps because of the strategy's latent
benefits to the companies.
2. Other Possible Test Cases
The suit in South Africa is a prime example of a lawsuit aimed at
preventing a government from exercising its lawful right-indeed,
obligation-to provide life-saving medications to its people. However,
there are other instances where conduct by pharmaceutical companies
might give rise to liability for the death or injury of PWAs unable to

139. Press Release, Oxfam, Medecins Sans Frontiers & Treatment Action Campaign, Drug
Companies in South Africa Capitulate Under a Barrage of Public Pressure (April 19, 2001),
availableat http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/2001/04-19-2001 .htm.
140. Swarns, supra note 138, at Al.
141. Id.
142. Heywood, supra note 129, at 6.
143. Id. at 7.
144. Swarns, supra note 138, at AI (quoting Hermant K. Shah, an industry analyst, discussing
the fact that drug companies will be unlikely to engage in similar lawsuits given their past
experiences in South Africa).
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Sadly, these instances show that the deterrent

effect of the negative publicity surrounding the South Africa suit was

minimal and short-lived, at best.
Finding itself in a public heath crisis very similar to that in South
Africa, Thailand issued compulsory licenses for the production and
importation of a generic form of Kaletra, a second-line AIDS
medication patented by Abbott Laboratories. 14 5 The initiative was part

of Thailand's campaign to provide universal access to treatment for its
citizens. 146 Although the compulsory license was for government use
only and therefore did not require prior negotiations for a permissive
license, the Thai government had made substantial efforts to obtain such
a license. 14 7 Moreover, issuance of the compulsory license would allow
14 8
the Thai government to save an additional 8,000 lives.
Abbott Laboratories, however, publicly stated that the Thai
government was ignoring patent protections, and, as a result refused to
register new drugs in Thailand and withdrew pending applications for
drug registration there, effectively cutting off the Thai market from
access to new Abbott-patented drugs. 149 Although Abbott's action was
145. Oxfam America, Abbott Pharmaceuticals in Thailand: Fact Sheet (Apr. 13, 2007),
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/whatwedo/campaigns/access to-medicines/news-publications/Ab
bott%20in%20Thailand (last visited Nov. 22, 2008) (discussing how pharmaceutical companies
are on the offensive against developing countries who seek to use compulsory licenses in order to
get access to generic drugs at lower prices). Second-line therapies are necessary for about twenty
percent of patients after they have been on first-line ARV therapies for five years. See MSF Press
Release, MSF Denounces Abbott's Move to Withhold Medicines from People in Thailand (Mar.
15, 2007), http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?component=pressrelease&objectid
=55646135-15C5-FOOA-25D3DAC13D288586&method=full-html (stating that an MSF study in
South Africa found that twenty percent of patients needed to switch to second-line therapies after
using first-line therapies for five years). As patents have expired on first-line therapies and prices
of those medications have diminished enormously, the prices of second line therapies have
become the major battle ground for AIDS activists trying to secure access to cheaper medications.
Id.
146. See MSF Press Release, supra note 145.
147. Brook K. Baker, Standing Up To Abbott's Decision to Withhold Registration and
Marketing of Life-Saving Medicines-A New Variant of PharmaceuticalApartheid, INTELL.
PROP. DiSp. IN MED., Mar. 13, 2007, http://www.cptech.org/blogs/ipdisputesinmedicine/
2007/03/standing-up-to-abbotts-decision-to.htm
(discussing Abbott Laboratories'
critical
response to the Thai government issuing a compulsory license on its second-line medication).
148. See Oxfam America, supra note 145. At the time of the dispute, Abbott was providing
Kaletra at $2,200 per year per patient, although it has now reduced that cost to $1,440 per year.
Id. See also Celia Dugger, Clinton FoundationAnnounces a Bargain on Generic AIDS Drugs,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at A9 (stating that Abbott has dropped its price of Kaletra to $1,000).
The Clinton Foundation announced an even lower price for a generic version of the drug,
produced by Indian manufacturers. Id.
149. Bruce Japsen, Abbott, Activists Tangle: Drug Giant's Chief Defends Response to
ThailandPatent Break, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 28, 2007, at Cl; Baker, supra note 147. At the time, the
medicines that were withdrawn from the registration process in Thailand included a new heat-
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not as clearly defined as filing a lawsuit, and thus is outside the
technical scope of this Article, potential liability based on retaliation

against the Thai government for its choice to exercise its rights under
TRIPS could be explored.
There are also two examples of lawsuits by pharmaceutical
companies against governments exercising their rights under TRIPS in
instances involving medications other than those for the treatment of
AIDS. Pfizer sued the Philippine government after it used parallel
importation to import tiny quantities of a patented drug for the purpose

of registering it in preparation for its marketing once the patent had
expired. 150 The early registration of the generic was TRIPS-compliant
under what is known as the "Bolar provision." 15 1 Pfizer undertook this
lawsuit even though the imported generic was not profited from,
marketed, or sold. 15 2 The case was settled without a conclusive
statement on whether or not the Philippine government had violated
53

Pfizer's patent.1

The most recent example of a pharmaceutical company's retaliation
against a government exercising TRIPS flexibility is Novartis's lawsuit

stable form of Kaletra, which was desperately needed in Thailand because of the lack of common
availability of refrigeration. Oxfam America, supra note 145. There were six other medications
that were also withdrawn, including medications to treat pain, high blood pressure, kidney
disease, blood clots, and antibiotics. Id.
150. Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Pfizer Fights IP Flexibilitiesin The Philippines, INTELL. PROP.
MONTHLY REP. (Apr. 30, 2006), available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.phpp=285.
151. Id.; see also WTO Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents, Obligations and
(last
Exceptions, http:/www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/factsheet-pharmO2_e.htm#art30
visited Aug. 10, 2008) (stating that Article 30 has been interpreted to provide a research exception
and "Bolar" provision, which permits the use of a patented drug to obtain marketing approval for
generics to be produced and registered upon the expiration of the patent period). The Philippines
had amended its intellectual property laws in 2007 to include TRIPS flexibilities, specifically to
address access to affordable medicines. See An Act Providing for Cheaper Medicines and for
(2007)
(Phil.),
available at
6035,
13th
Cong.
Purposes,
H.R.
Other
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/phil/philippines-bill-hb6035.pdf; see also An Act to Make the
Laws of Patents, Tradenames, and Trademarks More Responsive to the Heath Care Needs of the
Filipino People by Clarifying Non-Patentable Inventions, Allowing the Importation and Early
Development of Patented Medicines, and Modifying Government Use Provisions for Drugs or
Medicines, to Lower Prices and Increase Access to and Supply of Quality Drugs or Medicines,
Amending for this Purpose Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 8293 Otherwise Known as the
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, S. 2263, 13th Cong. (2006) (Phil.)., available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/healthc/phil/philippines-bill-sn2263.doc.
152. Gerhardsen, supra note 150 (stating that the Philippine International Trading Corporation
informed Pfizer it would not market the generic drug until Pfizer's patent expired).
153. Consumer Project on Technology, CPTech Analysis of the Settlement Order Republic of
the Philippines, Civil Case No. 06-172 (Aug. 31, 2006), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/
c/phil/Settlement.pdf (discussing how the settlement order was not a fair compromise between
Pfizer and the Philippine International Trading Corporation).
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To comply with TRIPS
against the government of India. 154
requirements, India amended its Patent Act in 2005 to start granting
patents for pharmaceutical products. 155 This legislation, however,
defined "patentability" narrowly, to prevent products from being
patented unless they were truly innovative (rather than slight
modifications on existing medications), which is consistent with the
baseline requirement of TRIPS. 156 Despite this lawful requirement,
Novartis sued the Indian government over its decision not to grant a
patent to a modified version of its leukemia medication, Gleevec,
alleging both that the denial of the patent violated TRIPS, and also that
15 7
the provisions of the Patent Act were unconstitutionally vague.
According to the activist organization Health GAP, "[t]he implications
of the case are much broader than one drug... [because g]eneric Indian
antiretrovirals are used for about half of all HIV treatment in poor
Furthermore, the effects of such lawsuits are
countries." 15 8
indisputable: drug prices will increase and people in these countries will
go without medications. 159 Fortunately, the trial court in India
concluded that it had no jurisdiction to decide whether the patent
provision complied with WTO rules contained in TRIPS, and that the
160 Novartis indicated
provision did not violate the Indian Constitution.
16 1
that it was unlikely to appeal the decision.
Nevertheless, even losses are victories for the drug companies.
While none of these suits has yet been successful, very few countries
have exercised their rights to issue compulsory licenses despite the clear
legal basis to do so under TRIPS. 162 Intimidation, frivolous lawsuits,
.and false accusations by pharmaceutical companies are clearly an

154. See generally Media Advisory, Novartis' India Patent Lawsuit Threatens Access to
Lifesaving Medicines, HEALTH GAP (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.healthgap.org/camp/novartis/
novartis.html [hereinafter HEALTH GAP].
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.; see Amelia Gentleman, Setbackfor Novartis in India Over Drug Patent, N.Y. TIMES,
cout ruling in favor of the India government will help
the
Aug. 7, 2007, at CI (discussing how
more patients by allowing Indian companies to continue manufacturing generic drugs).
158. HEALTH GAP, supra note 154. Although the drug at issue in this case is a leukemia
drug, the challenge to India's denial of a patent for this drug would have invalidated a central
component of India's Patent Act, namely that patents may not be issued for a merely "incremental
As Doctors Without Borders explained,
innovation." See Gentleman, supra note 157.
invalidating this provision could result in a "shutdown of the pharmacy for the developing
world." Id.
159. HEALTH GAP, supra note 154.
160. Gentleman, supra note 157.
161. Id.
162. Atik & Lidgard, supra note 86, at 1044.
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effective strategy to prevent governments from realizing their goals of
universal access to AIDS medication.
III. THE ATCA: DRUG COMPANIES ON THE DEFENSIVE
The ATCA was originally enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of
1789, but lay almost entirely dormant until the recent past. 16 3 Not only
does it not have any formal legislative history whatsoever, 164 the ATCA
was not developed through judicial interpretation until the 1980s. 165 in
the past quarter century, however, the ATCA has been rediscovered as a
166
vehicle for the private vindication of human rights violations.

Reinvigoration of the ATCA in this way is particularly remarkable
because no other country has a comparable statute. 16 7 Although first
used in suits against state actors, the ATCA has now provided a vehicle

163. Lucien J. Dhooge, Lohengrin Revealed: The Implications of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain for
Human Rights Litigation Pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 393, 394 (2006); see also Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort
Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 840 (2006) (asserting that the statute was "reborn" in 1980
with Fildrtigav. Pena-Irala,630 F.2d 876, 880-84 (2d Cir. 1980)).
164. Dhooge, supra note 163, at 398. The lack of legislative history has led to wide-ranging
theories as to the intent behind its passage, ranging from advancing national security and foreign
policy interests to the need for a federal forum to adjudicate claims asserted by foreigners, to the
desire to have a uniform federal interpretation of international law. Id. Courts' speculation on the
original purpose of the ATCA remains a frustration today as they are called on ever more
frequently to interpret its application. Id. at 397-98.
165. Although the first judicial reference to the ATCA was made in 1795 with respect to a
dispute over the ownership of slaves on a seized ship, the next reference was over 100 years later.
Dhooge, supra note 163, at 400. In a 1908 case, the Supreme Court made a passing reference to
the Act and lower courts twice suggested its possible application in cases dating back to 1961 and
1975. Id. The 1975 reference, made by the Ninth Circuit, was the first inkling of ATCA's
potential future use for human rights purposes against governments and private actors alike. See
Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975) (asserting the context of
liability for the illegal removal of children from Vietnam by U.S. agencies in conjunction with
private adoption companies, both of which the court suggested might be subject to suit under the
jurisdiction of the ATCA). In none of these 20th Century cases until Fildrtiga, however, was the
ATCA squarely relied upon or used as the jurisdictional basis for a suit. Dhooge, supra note 163,
at 400-01.
166. Lee, supra note 163, at 832-33.
167.

SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 21

(2004) (explaining that most transnational human rights cases against corporations have been
brought under the ATCA in the United States); see also Beth Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga: A
Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for InternationalHuman
Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2002) ("Civil human rights litigation generally
continues to be viewed as a peculiarly U.S. phenomenon."). Stephens asserts that the lack of
ATCA-type claims in other countries is due to the differing procedural practices of foreign legal
systems, but that the central goals of a these suits are addressed through other forms of domestic
remedies. Id. at 5. She frames the Fildrtiga goals as broadly providing avenues to justice for
victims of human rights violations and narrowly holding perpetrators accountable wherever they
are found. Id. at 4.
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for suits against a host of transnational corporations, including Unocal,
Shell, Rio
Tinto, Freeport McMoran, Exxon-Mobil, Pfizer, and Coca8
Cola.

16

In a scant sentence, the ATCA provides that "[t]he district court shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." 169 From the language of the ATCA, there are three required

elements: (1) the plaintiff is an alien; (2) the plaintiffs claim is based in
tort; and (3) the alleged tort is a violation of a treaty of the United States
or the law of nations. 170 It is the third element that provides a
significant hurdle to PWAs alleging human rights violations by

pharmaceutical companies, not only in defining what constitutes the
"law of nations", but also in some cases, the necessity of proving state

action or complicity thereto.
A. The Law of Nations
In Fildrtiga v. Pena-Irala,the 1980 landmark decision that revived
the ATCA, 17 ' the Second Circuit first squarely addressed the meaning
of the "law of nations," a definition that still carries weight despite
further evolution of ATCA law since that time. 172 In that case, Mr.
Fildrtiga was a political dissident living in the U.S. He sued an

individual who allegedly tortured his son in retribution for Mr.
168. JOSEPH, supra note 167, at 22.
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
170. Luis Enrique Cuervo, The Alien Tort Statute, CorporateAccountability, and the New Lex
Petrolea, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 151, 164 (2006).
171. Tarek F. Maassarani, Four Counts of Corporate Complicity: Alternative Forms of
Accomplice Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 39, 42
(2006) (asserting that Fildrtiga paved the way for contemporary human rights litigation by
establishing that courts must interpret international law as it evolved and exists among the nations
of the world today).
172. FilArtiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-84 (2d Cir. 1980). Joseph notes, however, that
some courts, rather than follow Fildrtiga, required that a breach of the "law of nations" be
"definable, obligatory, and universally condemned." JOSEPH, supra note 167, at 23 (quoting Forti
v. Suarez-Masou, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 539-0 (N.D. Ca. 1987), superseded by statute, Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, as recognized in Papa v. U.S.,
281 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2002)). However, Joseph argues that this alternate standard is not
derived from international law at all, but rather was created by U.S. jurisprudence as an attempt to
"translate the test for identifying customary international law." JOSEPH, supra note 167, at 24.
Indeed, she posits that the universality requirement is actually in conflict with the standards of
customary international law, which allow "persistent objectors" to an international standard not
to, by means of their non-consent, be bound by it. Id. Customary international law, therefore,
recognizes an inherently non-universal standard. See id. However, Joseph asserts that most
courts interpreted the universality requirement in the spirit of the customary international law
standard, requiring only that plaintiffs show a general recognition among states, rather than
unanimity. Id.
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Fildrtiga's political activities and beliefs. 173
Although he had
commenced a criminal action in Paraguay, the political machinery there
repressed the action. 174 Upon learning that the defendant was living in
the U.S., Mr. Filirtiga filed suit in federal court under the ATCA. 175 In
applying the "law of nations" prong of the ATCA, the court sought to
define customary international law and looked to the United Nations
Charter to determine that the way a government treats its own citizens
"is a matter of international concern." 176 It found that customary
international law was "evidenced and defined" in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 177 the Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 17 8 and modern
17 9
international legal standards.
The ATCA issue addressed in Fildrtiga-themeaning of the "law of
nations"-has now been the subject of much controversy, as plaintiffs
have alleged a wide range of harms to personal welfare.1 80 Twenty-four
years later, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court of the
United States issued its sole decision addressing the meaning of the
"law of nations" under the ATCA. 181 In Sosa, the Court considered the
claims of a Mexican national, Humberto Alvarez-Machain. AlvarezMachain alleged that the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency conspired to
hire Mexican operatives to capture and transport him to the United
States for the purpose of his arrest and detention, in violation of clear
international law against arbitrary arrest and detention. 18 2 Although
173. Fildrtiga,630 F.2d at 878. Mr. Fil~rtiga was joined by his daughter as a co-plaintiff. Id.
His daughter allegedly was confronted by the defendant with the tortured body of her brother as a
threat against any further political dissidence. Id.
174. Id. at 878.
175. Id. at 879. The Fildrtigas had applied for political asylum; the defendant overstayed a
visitor's visa and was subject to deportation, which was stayed briefly as a result of this suit, but
which was eventually realized. Id. at 879-80.
176. Id. at 881. The United Nations Charter is a treaty of the United States. U.N. Charter art.
55-56, availableat http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
177. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 882; see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A
(11I), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
178. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 882-83; see Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
G.A. Res. 3452, at 91, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (Dec. 9, 1975)
[hereinafter Torture Convention].
179. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 883.
180. See Dhooge, supra note 163, at 401-02 (asserting that personal welfare human right
claims have been advanced in several cases).
181. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
182. Id. at 698. The apparent reason for the capture of Alvarez-Machain in this fashion was
the inability of the U.S. and Mexico to successfully negotiate getting him into the United States.
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Alvarez-Machain brought claims against a host of defendants, his claim
against Sosa, one of the Mexican nationals who kidnapped Alvarez183
Machain, was entirely based on the ATCA.
In addressing the ATCA claim, the Court determined that the statute
was meant to "enable[] federal courts to hear claims in a very limited
category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common
law." 184 After an extensive examination of the history of the statute, the
absence of legislative history behind this portion of the Judiciary Act
prompted the Court to declare that "it is fair to say that a consensus
185
understanding of what Congress intended has proven elusive."
Based on the limited interpretive aides available, the Court concluded
that "courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of

nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features
86
of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized."1
Id. The U.S. had a warrant for Alvarez-Machain's arrest, based on his alleged involvement in the
capture, torture, and murder of a DEA operative in Mexico. Id. at 697-98.
183. Id. at 698. Alvarez-Machain had also contested the legitimacy of his indictment, but
failed in having his case dismissed. Id. After trial, his motion for a judgment of acquittal was
allowed at the close of the government's case. Id.
184. Id. at 712. This statement was meant to answer a longstanding dispute. Prior to Sosa,
there was a vigorous debate over whether the ATCA provided jurisdiction and international law
supplied independent causes of action, or whether the cause of action existed within the ATCA
itself, thus transforming it into more than merely jurisdictional in nature. See Beth Stephens,
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: "The Door is Still Ajar" for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts,
70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 542 (2004). Some jurists and commentators went so far as to argue that
the ATCA actually encompassed no existing causes of action, and that in order for it to take
effect, further congressional action would be needed. See id. at 541 & n.41. Indeed, Sosa argued
the latter point, urging the court to find that "ATS was stillborn because there could be no claim
for relief without a further statute expressly authorizing adoption of causes of action." Sosa, 542
U.S. at 714. Rather than adopting such a position, the Court held that torts in violation of the
laws of nations as causes of action that fell within the common law at the time the statute was
enacted were meant to be actionable under the statute. Id. It can therefore be said that, although
the ATCA does not create independent rights of action not otherwise available, it does provide
jurisdiction over rights of action already available under customary international law, because
such law has been incorporated into federal common law. See Stephens, supra, at 546. Justice
Scalia's dissent, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Tlotuas, faulted the majority for allowing
claims under federal common law in light of the holding in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938), that there is no general federal common law. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 741, 744
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 718-19.
186. Id. at 725. Stephens notes that this approach "mirrors" the standards that had been
employed by lower courts and that Sosa in fact cites lower court cases with approval, recognizing
that its decision is in harmony with many prior decisions, particularly Fildrrtiga. Stephens, supra
note 184, at 551 n.89. Indeed, post-Sosa cases continue to positively cite Fildrrtiga and other
decisions that interpreted the law of nations clause of the ATCA prior to any Supreme Court
ruling on point. See, e.g., Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517
F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2008), aff'g 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Fildrtiga and
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This is, therefore, the tough standard--encompassing requirements
both for wide international acceptance and well-defined specificitythat PWA plaintiffs must meet to claim a violation of their rights under
the ATCA. 187 Nonetheless, one commentator suggests that "the
decision is a clear victory for those human rights advocates who view
the statute as a means to hold the most egregious perpetrators
188
accountable for the most egregious violations of international law."
This is especially true because the Court articulated a standard for
determining which torts the ATCA remedies that is not limited to those
torts that would have been recognized at the time the ATCA was
89
passed. 1
Despite the fact that the Court in Sosa left open the possibility of
successful suits under the "law of nations" clause of the ATCA, the
Court rejected Alvarez-Machain's particular claim because a ban on
"arbitrary detention" that lasted only one day was "so broad [it could
not have] the status of a binding customary norm today."' 190 Although
this narrow holding does not bear directly on the question of whether
Flores v. S. Peru, Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003) for the purpose of articulating the
sources of customary international law).
187. See De Los Santos Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 208 (2d Cir. 2008) ("To provide a
cause of action under the ATS, a customary international law tort must meet a 'high bar' for
recognizing new causes of action: it must be both specific and well-accepted." (citing Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004))); see also Stephens, supra note 184, at 551 & n.89
("The Court presented this standard-definite content and widespread acceptance-as a stringent
test intended to prevent litigation of claims for lesser, more parochial, or idiosyncratic
prohibitions," and noting that this approach "mirrors that applied by most of the lower courts
considering ATS claims before Sosa."). This standard was set to be a very difficult one to meet
for a variety of reasons explained by the Court. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. The Court urged
"judicial caution" as a result of the shift in attitudes about the common law (being man-created
rather than naturally occurring), the limited nature of federal common law as reflected by the
watershed Erie decision, and the preference for legislatively created private fights of action rather
than implied rights of action. Id. at 725-27. Moreover, the Court expressed concerns over the
implications for foreign relations and the lack of clarity over the courts' role in such cases. Id. at
727-28.
188. Stephens, supra note 184, at 535. In one post-Sosa decision, the Sixth Circuit
proclaimed that ATCA "holds great potential to bring justice to certain serious violations of
human, civil, and environmental rights in a federal forum." Tavaras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767,
771 (6th Cir. 2007). Indeed, some plaintiffs' claims have already survived the Sosa standards.
See, e.g., Mohammed v. Mohammed Vital Bin Tarraf, 114 F. App'x 417,419 (2d. Cir. 2004).
189. Stephens, supra note 184, at 550. In fact, the Court noted that at the time, only three
causes of action would have been generally recognized under the law of nations, those being
piracy, offenses against ambassadors, and violations of safe conducts. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723-24.
190. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 736. The Court later clarified that the tort that Alvarez-Machain
suffered did not rise to the level of specificity, i.e. was not sufficiently well-defined, to constitute
a violation of customary international law. Id. at 738. In part, the Court was persuaded that so
many claims would fall into the category of "arbitrary" arrest and detention as Alvarez-Machain
defined it (which required only that it be in violation of the law of the jurisdiction in which the
arrest and detention occurred) that "the implications would be breathtaking." Id. at 736.

Vindicating the Rights of People Living With AIDS

2009]

675

PWA plaintiffs could make out a cause of action under the ATCA, the

sources of law the Court credited are instructive to future plaintiffs.
First, the Court rejected the notion that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) 191 was persuasive authority, because although it
provided "moral authority," it is not a binding international agreement
and therefore does not impose legal obligations. 192 More surprisingly,
the Court also rejected the authority of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights 193 even though it is a treaty with many
signatories, including the United States, and is thus binding
international law. The Court reasoned that the United States signed it
with the "express understanding that it was not self-executing and
therefore did not itself create obligations enforceable in federal
courts."

194

However, the Court did positively reference the Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (hereinafter
"Restatement"), 19 5 which declares that a state policy of "prolonged"

arbitrary detention is a violation of customary international law. 196 In
part because Alvarez-Machain's claim was not of a "state policy" or
"prolonged" detention, the Court found that there was no alleged

191. UDHR, supra note 177. The UDHR, adopted in 1948, was the first attempt to codify a
set of human rights guarantees. See id.; see also JEANNE M. WOODS & HOPE LEWIS, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE; ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS

179 (2005). Although it was "not intended to have the legally binding effect of a multi-lateral
treaty," at least some of its provisions have been incorporated, in practice, into customary
international law. WOODS & LEWIS, supra, at 179. The UDHR is also the first of three U.N.
documents which, collectively, are known as the "International Bill of Rights." Id.
192. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734.
193. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), [ 21, U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR]. Article 9 of the ICCPR, to which AlvarezMachan pointed in support of his claim, declares that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention," and provides further elaboration of what that right should entail. Id. at art. 9.
There are 152 states-parties to the ICCPR. See U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Status of Ratifications, -http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Nov. 23,
2008).
194. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004). The United States officially
declared, upon becoming a party to the ICCPR, that the ICCPR was not "self-executing" and that
the "Covenant shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises
legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein." U.N. Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Declarations and Reservations to the ICCPR,
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty5-asp.tm (last visited Nov. 23, 2008).
195.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1986);

see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737 ("Alvarez's failure to marshal support for his proposed rule is
underscored by the Restatement ... ").
196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702

(1986); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737.
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violation of a customary international law. 197 According to the Court:
"[i]t is enough to hold that a single illegal detention of less than a day,
followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt
arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well
19 8
defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy."'
Based on the Sosa Court's middle ground approach to the ATCA,
PWA plaintiffs could allege a violation of a variety of different
recognized human rights. 19 9 The most plausible claims are violations of
the rights to health and life found in numerous statements of

international law. 200 Admittedly, "[c]onsiderable disagreement exists as

to whether 'health' is an identifiable, operational, and enforceable right,
or whether it is merely aspirational and rhetorical. 20 1 Indeed, lower
courts' interpretations of the ATCA are consistent with the view that the
right to "health" or "life" does not meet the "specificity" requirement of
the ATCA. 20 2 For instance, in one case, plaintiffs bringing an ATCA
claim asserted inter alia that the corporate defendant had violated their
rights to life and health by constructing an extremely dangerous and
environmentally damaging mine with the assistance of the national
government. 20 3 The district court held that the rights to health and life
197. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737.
198. Id. at 738.
199. Depending on the circumstances of the PWA plaintiffs in a given case, violations of the
rights of women or children may occur, or violations of the prohibitions on torture or genocide
may occur. In the generalized circumstances discussed in this Article, concerning drug-company
lawsuits such as the one in South Africa, these rights are much harder to implicate. One
remaining possibility, however, lies in the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race
or national origin, which is protected in many international documents, most specifically
articulated under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. See
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res.
2106 (XX), at 45, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter ICERD]. Although this Article
will not address in detail a potential claim based upon racial discrimination, it certainly could be
argued that the factual basis for a racial discrimination claim in the context of pharmaceutical
access for PWAs in Africa exists. Moreover, pervasive or systematic racial discrimination can
arguably form the basis for an ATCA claim. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(f) (1986); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd.,
504 F.3d 254, 260-61 (2d Cir. 2007), afftd, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008) (reversing the dismissal of an
ATCA claim that arose out of South Africa's apartheid system, which alleged, inter alia,
violations of the right to be free from racial discrimination); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,
487 F.3d 1193, 1209 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Acts of racial discrimination are violations of jus cogens
norms."), reh'g granteden banc, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007).
200. See Dhooge, supra note 163, at 432, 435 (discussing the various instruments that
recognize the rights to health and life).
201. GOSTIN, supra note 34, at 82.
202. See JOSEPH, supra note 167, at 27 (explaining that U.S. courts have found that the rights
to life and health do not activate the ATCA because they are not breaches of the law of nations).
203. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Rio Tinto I), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 456 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006) (Rio Tinto II) (noting that neither
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in this context were not specifically defined as required for an ATCA
claim. 20 4 Similarly, the Second Circuit, considering the claims of the
residents of a Peruvian town where the defendant's mining endeavors
claimed many lives, concluded that the rights to health and life were

"insufficiently definite to constitute rules of customary international

20 5
law," and declared that the rights were "vague and amorphous."
Finally, one court, nudging the door open slightly for such claims,
declared that these rights were "not yet definite enough, 20 6 presumably
allowing other plaintiffs the opportunity to allege facts that shape the
standards into better-defined human rights.
In spite of courts' past unwillingness to allow ATCA claims to
proceed based on allegations that plaintiffs' rights to life and health
have been violated, PWA plaintiffs in the circumstances discussed here
are in a unique position to cure the specificity problem. They would
not, for instance, be able to overcome the hurdle if they simply alleged
that a government failed to make sufficient efforts to provide medicines;
"sufficient" is certainly in the eye of the beholder. 20 7 The problem of
specificity arises where it is unclear what a government's "best efforts"
would be. However, if the government already took actions to ensure
access to medications, it necessarily demonstrated that those actions
were possible. In this way, although failure to make any specific effort
may not be actionable under the ATCA, 20 8 affirmative steps taken by
pharmaceutical companies to impede or negate governments' efforts to

party appealed this holding), withdrawn and superseded on reh'g in part, Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rio Tinto III), reh'g en banc granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir.
2007), reh 'g en banc, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008).
204. Rio Tinto 1, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 ("[T]he court cannot conclude that the rights are
sufficiently 'specific' that their alleged violation states a claim under the ATCA.").
205. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 254 (2d Cir. 2003). In support of this
notion, the court cites, among others, the UDHR, which states that "[e]veryone has a right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family," and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which "recognizes the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health." Id;
see UDHR, supra note 177, at 71; see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at art. 12, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc A/6316
(Jan 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. Cf Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d
457, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissing a claimed violation of the right to life).
206. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
207. See generally U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights [CESCR], Substantive
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14, $ 9 (2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C. 12.2000.4.En.
208. See, e.g., Rio Tinto I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1157 (finding that the right to health is not
sufficiently specific and definable).
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meet their obligations that were already made and therefore readily
definable, violates a highly specific right.
For instance, a claim arising in the context of the pharmaceutical
companies' lawsuit against the South African government, which
passed a law specifically to lower the cost of life-saving medications,
presents a type of cure to the specificity problem. Each of the
instruments defining the right to health generally, and the right to AIDS
medication specifically, define the right as the right to have the
government make continual efforts to progressively realize those
goals.20 9 Therefore, PWA plaintiffs in South Africa may allege that the
government's amendment to the Medicines Act to allow parallel
importation establishes that parallel importation is an effort that is
possible, and the pharmaceutical companies' retaliation against that
effort, which effectively impeded its implementation, violated their
rights to the government's "best" efforts.
Thus, PWA plaintiffs should be able to cure the problemspecificity-that has plagued other plaintiffs alleging violations of the
ATCA based on internationally-recognized rights to health and life.
Notably, courts have only dismissed such claims based on the failure of
those rights to be specific and definite, not on the basis of nonIndeed, PWA
agreement among the international community. 2 10
of these rights, in
plaintiffs can demonstrate the well-accepted nature
2 11
addition to specificity, to state a cognizable claim.
In light of Sosa, the Restatement is a persuasive place to start an
analysis of whether a claim implicates a right that is sufficiently well2 12
accepted as to constitute a part of customary international law.
Section 702 of the Restatement, entitled "Customary International Law
of Human Rights," asserts that a state violates international law if,
[A]s a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones (a)
genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or causing the
disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent2 pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights. 3

209. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 205.
210. See infra.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 181-85 and note 184.
212. JOSEPH, supra note 167, at 25-26 ("One of the most authoritative (and perhaps more
conservative) lists of customary human rights for the purposes of findings in U.S. Courts is in the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702.").
213. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(1986)
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The most promising avenue for PWAs under the Restatement is
section 702(g), where violations of otherwise unspecified rights, when
occurring en masse, are said to constitute violations of customary
international law. 2 14 The comment to section 702(g) explains that a
violation is "gross" when it "is particularly shocking because of the
importance of the right or the gravity of the violation." 2 15 Although the
right to health or life is not specifically mentioned in this comment, the
UDHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) are both affirmed as bases for finding aggregate violations of
2 16
rights protected by customary international law under section 702(g).
The right to life appears prominently in the UDHR, the very first
international instrument defining human rights, adopted in 1948.217
Article Three of the UDHR states that "[e]veryone has the right to life,
liberty and the security of person." 2 18 Article Twenty-Five, while not
specifically enumerating health as a right in and of itself, does state that
everyone "has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services." 2 19 Similarly,
the ICCPR declares that "[e]very human being has the inherent right to
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily
220
deprived of his life."
The right to health does not appear in the ICCPR, but does appear
prominently in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which states that the "States parties to the
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of

214. Id. § 702(g); see JOSEPH, supra note 167, at 25-26 ('Consistent patterns of gross
violations of internationally recognised rights is an avenue for holding perpetrators of multiple or
at least mass abuses liable even when the individual abuses fall short of customary human rights
violations.").
215.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702,

cmt. (m)(1986). The severity of the AIDS pandemic and the nature of the crisis, discussed
supra, Part II, go to the heart of this comment.
216. See id. Specifically mentioned rights under this section include: "systematic harassment;
invasions of the privacy of the home; arbitrary arrest and detention (even if not prolonged); denial
of fair trial in criminal cases; grossly disproportionate punishment; denial of freedom to leave a
country; denial of the right to return to one's country; mass uprooting of a country's population;
denial of freedom of conscience and religion; denial of personality before the law; denial of basic
privacy such as the right to marry and raise a family; and invidious racial or religious
discrimination." Id.
217. UDHR, supra note 177, art. 3.
218. Id.
219. Id. at art. 25.
220. ICCPR, supra note 193, art. 6.
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the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. '2 2 1 The
provision continues to state that governments shall take steps "to
achieve the full realization of this right" including "the prevention,
treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other
disease." 222 Overall, the right to life is enumerated in ten different
international legal instruments, while the right to health appears in
eight.

2 23

In 2000, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR) issued a comment to the ICESCR addressing the
224
meaning of the right to the "highest attainable standard" of health.
The CESCR notes that the right to health has been recognized by
several other prominent international human rights instruments,
including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, and numerous regional instruments. 2 25 Furthermore, the
comment to the ICESCR recognizes that the right to the highest
attainable standard of health necessarily takes into account a state's
available resources. 226 The obligations of a state, however, include
providing facilities, goods, and services depending necessarily on the
22 7
state's developmental level, but including essential drugs.
221. ICESCR, supra note 205, art. 12. The United States is not a party to the ICESCR.
222. Id.
223. Dhooge, supra note 163, at 432, 435.
224. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Gen. Comment 14, The Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2000/4 (Nov. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Comment
14]. The ECOSOC is a body of independent experts that monitors the implementation of the
ICESCR by receiving reports from States parties, holds working groups, and publishes
interpretations of the provisions of the Covenant. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights [CESCR], http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/index.htm (last visited
April 29, 2007).
225. Comment 14, supra note 224, 2; see also ICERD, supra note 199; Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 513;
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
226. Comment 14, supra note 224, 1 9 ("The notion of 'the highest attainable standard of
health' in article 12.1 takes into account both the individual's biological and socio-economic
preconditions and a State's available resources. There are a number of aspects which cannot be
addressed solely within the relationship between States and individuals; in particular, good health
cannot be ensured by a State, nor can States provide protection against every possible cause of
human ill health. Thus, genetic factors, individual susceptibility to ill health and the adoption of
unhealthy or risky lifestyles may play an important role with respect to an individual's health.
Consequently, the right to health must be understood as a right to the enjoyment of a variety of
facilities, goods, services and conditions necessary for the realization of the highest attainable
standard of health.").
227. Id. T]12(a) ("Availability. Functioning public health and health-care facilities, goods and
services, as well as programmes, have to be available in sufficient quantity within the State party.
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Furthermore, the "progressive realization of the right to health over a
period of time . . . means that States-parties have a specific and
continuing obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as
possible towards the full realization of article 12," which ensures the
"right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
presumptively
physical and mental health. '22 8 Similarly, the Covenant
2 29
bans "retrogression" in relation to the right to health.
International authority has also spoken specifically on obligations
relating to the AIDS pandemic. As far back as 1978, the United Nations
recognized the need for international action regarding HIV/AIDS. 230 In
2002, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights and UNAIDS jointly issued HIV/AIDS and Human Rights
International Guidelines. 2 3 1 These guidelines clarify that states should
"enact legislation to provide for ... safe and effective medication at an
affordable price." 23 2 The premise of these guidelines was that "access
to HIV/AIDS-related treatment is fundamental to realizing the right to
health. 2 3 3 Thus, through these international statements, PWA plaintiffs
can argue that they have a right, protected by customary international
law, to their government's best efforts to provide life-saving AIDS
medication.
PWA plaintiffs can therefore demonstrate both the well-accepted and
specific nature of the rights to health and life. In this way, a company
should be liable under the ATCA when it engages in conduct which it
knows or should know will disrupt a government's legitimate efforts to
protect citizens' rights and to fulfill its obligations under international
law.

The precise nature of the facilities, goods and services will vary depending on numerous factors,
including the State party's developmental level. They will include, however, the underlying
determinants of health, such as safe and potable drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities,
hospitals, clinics and other health-related buildings, trained medical and professional personnel
receiving domestically competitive salaries, and essential drugs, as defined by the WHO Action
Programme on Essential Drugs.").
228. Id. 1 31; see ICESCR, supra note 205, at art. 12.
229. Comment 14, supra note 224, 32 ("As with all other rights in the Covenant, there is a
strong presumption that retrogressive measures taken in relation to the right to health are not
permissible. If any deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the State party has the burden
of proving that they have been introduced after the most careful consideration of all alternatives
and that they are duly justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the
Covenant in the context of the full use of the State party's maximum available resources.").
230. GOSTIN, supra note 34, at 78.
231. H1V/AIDS and Human Rights International Guidelines, U.N. Doc. UNAIDS/02.49E
(Aug. 2002), availableat http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/g6.pdf.
232. Id. at Guideline 6.
233. Id. at Guideline 11.
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B. State Action
Customary international law typically governs only the conduct of
governments, not private actors. 2 34 However, some norms do apply
equally to private citizens and corporations, 235 and it is unclear under
what secondary liability theories state action must be demonstrated. 2 36
The state action issue presents a second challenge to PWA plaintiffs.2 3 7
In order to state a claim under the ATCA, they will need to show that a
pharmaceutical company either violated one of the norms that does not
require state action, that the company is liable under a secondary
liability theory, or that the company itself constitutes a state actor in the
circumstances of the case.
The first possible avenue for any plaintiff alleging a violation of
ATCA is to assert that the defendant has violated one of the small group
of customary international laws which apply equally to private citizens
and to state actors. 2 38 This principle, as applied to the ATCA, was first
announced by the Second Circuit in Kadic v. Karadzic. In that case,
victims of atrocities committed by Bosnian-Serb military forces during
the Bosnian civil war sued the leader of the self-proclaimed BosnianSerb republic, not internationally recognized, located within BosniaHerzegovina. 239 In Kadic, the Second Circuit concluded that "certain
forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those
acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals." 240 In
so deciding, the court looked to section 404 of the Restatement,
addressing Universal Jurisdiction to Define and Punish Certain
Offenses, which proclaims that
[a] state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal
concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft,
234. JOSEPH, supra note 167, at 48. See generally Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in
a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 383 (2006).
235. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995).
236. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C99-02506, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63209, at *36 &
n.14. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21,2006).
237. See, e.g., Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 114 (5th Cir. 1988)
(dismissing a suit brought against a corporation for torture committed abroad because of lack of
jurisdiction under ATCA where there was no evidence that the corporation "conspire[d] in, or
aid[ed] and abet[ted], official acts of torture").
238. This is a subset of the totality of jus cogens norms, which describes international norms
that a state itself cannot reject. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (8th ed. 1999) (defining jus
cogens as "[a] mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law accepted and
recognized by the international community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted. A
peremptory norm can be modified only by a later norm that has the same character.").
239. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-37.
240. Id. at 239.
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genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts
of terrorism, even
24 1
where [no other basis of jurisdiction] is present.

The court concluded that the ATCA supported liability for private
242
actors who commit offenses of "universal concern."
Due to the very limited number of offenses of "universal concern,"
listed in the Restatement, it would be difficult for PWA plaintiffs
alleging a violation of the rights to health and life to assert that those

rights fell within this list, or analogized to a right contained therein. As
this Article limited its discussion to potential claims of violations of the
rights to health and life, the "universal concern" doctrine under the
ATCA would likely be of little help.2 43 Moreover, even though the
norms of universal concern are not strictly limited by the Restatement,
courts look to the definitions of the rights at issue as enumerated in
international instruments to see if state action is required when
broadening the basis for such violations. 244 The rights to life and health
are defined as the rights to the governments' best efforts, discussed
above. 24 5 Because the definitions of the rights themselves encompass
state action, it is unconvincing to argue under current ATCA
jurisprudence that these rights should be added to the list of norms of
universal concern.
However, the second possible avenue-claims against corporations
under a secondary liability doctrine-has great potential. In 1997, for
the first time, a district court in California held that a corporation could
be held liable for human rights abuses committed abroad under the
24 6
ATCA using a secondary liability theory, namely aiding and abetting.
241. Id. at 240 n.4; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1986)
242. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240.
243. If, however, PWA plaintiffs could garner facts sufficient to support a claim of genocide
(certainly possible given the magnitude of fatalities at issue), the "universal concern" theory of
liability for private actors would be eminently applicable. See supra note 199 and accompanying
text. It is important to note that because the facts are such that the pharmaceutical companies are
not directly withholding medicines or directly violating PWAs rights to health and life, even if a
violation of "universal concern" is alleged, a secondary theory of liability would still need to be
viable. Thus, the PWAs would still need to demonstrate that by filing the lawsuit, the
pharmaceutical companies were aiding and abetting the state's violation of its own citizen's
human rights. The details of this theory of liability are discussed infra.
244. See generally Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241-44 (discussing all of the various international
instruments defining genocide, war crimes, torture, and summary execution when determining if
each norm required state action or applied generally to all actors).
245. See supra Part III.A.
246. Maassarani, supra note 171, at 40; see also Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (Unocal I), affid, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (Unocal II), reh 'g en banc ordered, 395
F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003). The case settled before the rehearing en banc on the merits.
Consequently, the 2002 three-judge panel decision by the Ninth Circuit still stands.
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In that case, Doe v. Unocal, farmers in Burma brought a class action
suit against a California-based oil company alleging forced relocation,
forced labor, seized property, torture, rape, assault, and murder of
247
residents in a region where the company had built an oil pipeline.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant corporation had used the
controlling military power in the region to force the relocation of whole
2 48
villages to further the pipeline project.
In affirming the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit, relying on
Kadic, allowed claims of violations of norms of universal concern 24 9 to
go forward on the theory that Unocal could be held liable for aiding and
abetting the Burmese military's imposition of forced labor on the
plaintiffs. 250 Although Unocal applied aiding and abetting liability only
to violations of norms of universal concern, 251 some subsequent
decisions have applied aiding and abetting liability to corporate or
private actors even where state action would otherwise be required. In
Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, a post-Sosa case, the Eleventh
Circuit declared that a claim alleging torture under the ATCA "reaches
conspiracies and accomplice liability." 25 2 Moreover, the Aldana court
allowed claims to move forward against private security forces for their
participation in torture under a secondary liability theory, so long as the
2 53
government's role itself constituted state action.
Similarly, in Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum, a district court in
California considered claims of torture and extrajudicial killing by the
Columbian military both for the benefit and with the help of the
defendant corporation. 254 Although the ATCA was not squarely at
issue in that case, the court analogized to it, noting that the ATCA
would permit aiding and abetting liability for a corporation in this
circumstance. 2 55 Because torture is a violation of the law of nations
247. Unocal 1, 963 F. Supp. at 883.
248. Id.
249. The court also reasoned, based on Kadic, that "even crimes like rape, torture, and
summary execution, which by themselves require state action for ATCA liability to attach, do not
require state action when committed in furtherance of other crimes like slave trading, genocide or
war crimes, which by themselves do not require state action for ATCA liability to attach."
Unocal II, 395 F.3d at 946.
250. Id. at 947.
251. Id. (finding that "Unocal may be liable under the ATCA for aiding and abetting the
Myanmar Military in subjecting Plaintiffs to forced labor," which they analogized to slavery, and
thus did not require a showing of state action).
252. Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157 (11 th Cir. 2005)).
253. Id. at 1249-50.
254. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168-69 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
255. Id. at 1173 n.6.
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only when committed by the state, 25 6 both decisions support the
conclusion that corporations can be held liable for aiding and abetting
the state's violations of customary international law that is not of
"universal concern."
This conclusion is not without disagreement. 2 57 In one case, a
district court objected that "[corporate d]efendants could not be held
liable for directly committing the [non-universal concern] offenses; it
therefore makes little sense to find them liable for lesser [aiding and
abetting] conduct." 2 58 Nonetheless, PWA plaintiffs can argue that the
Aldana court correctly determined that aiding and abetting liability can
attach to private parties even where state action is required, so long as
the private parties are aiding and abetting a state actor's commission of
the violation.
In order for PWA plaintiffs to successfully make that argument, they
therefore need to show that the actions of the pharmaceutical companies
aided or abetted that violation under a standard similar to that
enumerated in Unocal. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the
corporate defendant could be held liable under the ATCA if it engaged
in "knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial
effect on the perpetration of the crime. '"259 This standard is particularly
noteworthy, insofar as it does not include a requirement that the
corporation harbor the specific intention that the violation occur; rather,
it only requires that the corporation knew or should reasonably have
known that its conduct would lead to a violation of the law of
nations 260
Although in Unocal the right that was violated was a negative rightthat is, the right to be free from forced labor-and the right at issue in
256. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (Unocal II) ("[W]e adopted the
Second Circuit's conclusion that 'acts of rape, torture, and summary execution,' like most crimes,
'are proscribed by international law only when committed by state officials or under color of
law."') (quoting Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1995)).
257. It is possible to reconcile these decisions if one reads Aldana's holding to require such an
amount of "aiding and abetting" that private actions themselves can be considered under "color of
law" as a result of those actions being taken together with the actions of state actors. See Chavez
v. Carranza, 413 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (W.D. Tenn. 2005). However, Aldana does not explicitly
so state, and other courts have noted the tension that Aldana's holding has with the state action
doctrine. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp, No. C99-02506, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63209, at *36
n.14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2006).
258. Bowoto, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63209, at *33.
259. Unocal 11, 395 F.3d at 947. The court also stated that it was "leaving the question
whether such liability should also be imposed for moral support which has the required
substantial effect for another day," although it noted in a footnote that there "may be no
difference between encouragement and moral support." Id. at 951 & n.28.
260. Id. at 950, 953.
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this case is a positive right-the right to have one's government make
best efforts to provide for the preservation of one's health and life-the
Ninth Circuit standard does not facially preclude liability. Just as
Unocal allegedly took positive steps to help the Burmese government

commit violations of the rights of Burmese citizens,261 PWA plaintiffs
can allege that the thirty-nine pharmaceutical companies who filed a

lawsuit took positive steps to prevent the South African government
262
from ensuring the South Africans' human rights were fulfilled.
Indeed, how else could a company aid and abet the violation of a
positive right, except to interfere with the government's attempts to
meet their obligations? Moreover, the pharmaceutical companies'
motivations for these actions are irrelevant, so long as they knew or
should have known that the violation would occur. 263 An aiding and

abetting theory of liability is likely the most potent way of holding
pharmaceutical companies liable for PWAs deaths and health declines
264
in these circumstances.
Finally, if a court rejected an aiding and abetting theory for a nonstate actor in circumstances where no norm of universal concern was
implicated, PWA plaintiffs could take the third approach to satisfying
the state action requirement: they could argue that the pharmaceutical
companies are themselves acting under "color of law." 26 5 State action

under the ATCA is typically determined under the same analysis as
claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.266 Under section 1983, state
261. Id.at 947.
262. See supra Part H.
263. See Unocal H, 395 F.3d at 947.
264. Finally, it is worth mentioning that, theoretically, there are other possible avenues of
secondary liability for private actors. The Ninth Circuit in Unocal 11 acknowledged that other
theories for corporate liability-including joint venture, agency, negligence, and recklessnessmay be appropriate under ATCA. Unocal H, 395 F.3d at 947 n.20. Furthermore, in finding the
defendant liable, the court specifically looked to international war crimes tribunals and other
sources of international law to ascertain the relevant liability theories. Id. at 949. As the court
explained, "[Wihat is a crime in one jurisdiction is often a tort in another jurisdiction, and this
distinction is therefore of little help in ascertaining the standards of international human rights
law." Id. at 948. Tarek Maassarani further suggests that Unocal set the stage for possibly even
more effective theories, including joint criminal enterprise, conspiracy, instigation, and
procurement. See generally Maassarani, supra note 171.
265. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Rio
Tinto I) (finding the Rio Tinto mining company to have acted under "color of law" because of its
various connections to the government of Papua New Guinea), rev'd in part on other grounds,
456 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006) (Rio Tinto II), withdrawn and superseded on reh'g in part,
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rio Tinto II), reh'g en banc granted,
499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008).
266. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386, 2002 WL 319887, at *"13
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("To determine whether a private actor acts under color of law in the context of
a claim under ATCA . . . the Court must look to the standards developed under 42 U.S.C. §
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action (i.e. acting under "color of law") can attach even when the action
is taken by private parties in various circumstances. For instance,
private parties can act under color of law if there is judicial enforcement
of unlawful behavior. 267 Moreover, private parties' actions may be
taken "under color of law" where the private party is acting in a

capacity that renders him indistinguishable from a state. 268

State

regulation of the private party or tangential involvement will typically
2 69
be insufficient.
One ATCA scholar has argued that "a State's failure to adequately
control a corporation [could] amount[] to 'state action' in international
law for the purposes of activating ATCA," which, she notes, "would
significantly lessen the burden in establishing the state action element of
the ATCA test in any case where a [corporation] has itself perpetrated a
breach of the law of nations." 2 70 Indeed, this view has support in a
recent Ninth Circuit decision, which allowed claims of racial
discrimination to go forward against Rio Tinto, a mining company, even
1983.") (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995)). Cf Doe v. Unocal Corp.,
963 F. Supp. 880, 891 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ("[W]here there is a substantial degree of cooperative
action between the state and private actors in effecting the deprivation of rights, state action is
present."). In its entirety, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against
a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
267. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of
restrictive covenants on housing based on race renders private discrimination state action).
268. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649. 663 (1944) (finding that the primary election of the
Democratic party, though run by private actors, nonetheless constituted state action).
269. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-76 (1972) (holding that regulation
of the lodge's liquor license did not render the lodge's discrimination state action). Joseph
analyzes the possible avenues for determining state action in accordance with § 1983 as including
"public function, state compulsion, nexus, joint action, and proximate cause." JOSEPH, supra
note 167, at 33. Of these, "proximate cause" is the label Joseph uses to describe the type of
liability that attaches when a corporation exercises "control over a State's perpetration of the
abuse." Id. at 34. This is the category in which Joseph places cases such as Doe v. Unocal,
where corporations fund (and indeed contract for) government functions. Id.
270. JOSEPH, supra note 167, at 39. Joseph notes that to her knowledge "such an argument
has never been raised in an ATCA case." Id. Moreover, she asserts that it is "uncertain the extent
to which a duty [to control corporations within one's territory] exists within customary
international law." Id.
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though racial discrimination claims require state action. 27 1 There, the
court affirmed a district court decision that Rio Tinto acted under "color
of law" when the company, allegedly motivated by racial
discrimination, destroyed the environment, sacred sites, and local
culture. 2 72 The district court concluded that "[p]laintiffs assert, in
essence, that [the government] made its governmental power of eminent
domain available to Rio Tinto so that it could build the mine, and that,
because of its profit participation in the mine, [the government] took no
steps to control or minimize the negative impact of Rio Tinto's mining
operations." 2 73 Thus, the court concluded, plaintiffs had sufficiently
pled facts supporting a finding that Rio Tinto was acting under color of
4
law.

27

PWA plaintiffs could argue that the pharmaceutical companies were
acting under color of law because the pharmaceutical companies, in
essence, hijacked the judicial process, a state action, thus violating the
plaintiffs' rights.
In this way, the lawsuit would constitute the
pharmaceutical companies' method of utilizing the power of the South
African government to illegally keep prices and profits high at the cost
of the health and lives of South African PWAs, and in violation of the
rights of South Africans to have their government make all efforts to
meet the needs of people living with HIV/AIDS. Moreover, the failure
of the judiciary to immediately dismiss such an action so as to allow the
timely implementation of the Medicines Act represents a failure to take
steps to control the corporation within its boundaries. This theory may
provide a sufficient basis, comparable to the theory in Sarei v. Rio Tinto
PLC, to demonstrate that the pharmaceutical companies' lawsuits, in
conjunction with the actions taken by the judiciary to allow the suits to
continue, constitute the necessary state action for ATCA purposes.
Whether by demonstrating that pharmaceutical companies were
aiding and abetting the state's violations of its people's customary
international law rights to life and health, or by demonstrating that the
pharmaceutical companies sufficiently used the power of the
government's judiciary to themselves be acting under color of law, the

271. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006) (Rio Tinto 11), withdrawn
and superseded on reh'g in part, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rio
Tinto HI), reh'g en banc granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc, 550 F.3d 822 (9th
Cir. 2008).
272. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Rio Tinto 1), rev'd
in part on other grounds, Rio Tinto H, 456 F.3d at 1077.
273. Rio Tinto 1, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
274. Id. at 1155.
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ATCA doctrine is sufficiently undeveloped and full of potential as to
accommodate the claims of PWA plaintiffs.
IV. CONCLUSION

In the face of a catastrophic pandemic disproportionately affecting
people of color in developing countries and continually depriving
people of their health, their lives, and the health and lives of their
children and families, haste is needed to take action. 27 5 Despite the fact
that treatment exists for HIV/AIDS, the vast majority of people in need
of such treatment do not receive it. 27 6 Meanwhile, the pharmaceutical
companies that manufacture these drugs are engaged in a multifaceted
campaign to keep the prices of this treatment out of the reach of most
people who need it, while limiting the ability of governments to provide
these medications to their populations. 277 Where the international
community has recognized that governments have an obligation to make
their best effort to meet the needs of people living with HIV/AIDS,
including providing affordable medications, and where governments are
this lawful
making those best efforts, lawsuits designed to impede
278
progress should be actionable conduct under the ATCA.

275.
276.
277.
278.

See generally supra Part I.
See generally supra Part I.
See generally supra Part I.B.
See generally supra Part III.

